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Abstract
Persistent Protection in Multicast Content Delivery
Malek Barhoush, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2012
Computer networks make it easy to distribute digital media at low cost. Digital rights
management (DRM) systems are designed to limit the access that paying subscribers
(and non-paying intruders) have to these digital media. However, current DRM
systems are tied to unicast delivery mechanisms, which do not scale well to very large
groups. In addition, the protection provided by DRM systems is in most cases not
persistent, i.e., it does not prevent the legitimate subscriber from re-distributing the
digital media after reception.
We have collected the requirements for digital rights management from various
sources, and presented them as a set of eleven requirements, associated with ﬁve
categories. Several examples of commercial DRM systems are brieﬂy explained and
the requirements that they meet are presented in tabular format. None of the example
systems meet all the requirements that we have listed. The security threats that
are faced by DRM systems are brieﬂy discussed. We have discussed approaches for
adapting DRM systems to multicast data transmission.
We have explored and evaluated the security protocols of a unicast distribution
model, published by Grimen, et al. that provides “persistent protection”. We have
found two security attacks and have provided the solution to overcome the discovered
attacks. Then we have proposed a more scalable architecture based on the modiﬁed
model. We call the resulting architecture persistent protection in multicast content
iii
delivery. We present and formally validate the protocol for control and data exchange
among the interacting parties of our proposal.
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1.1 Motivation for the Research
The phrase “Digital Content Distribution” describes the distribution, using the In-
ternet, of intellectual property from a Content Provider to one or more End Users.
Most contemporary Content Distribution systems establish a one-on-one (unicast) re-
lationship between the Content Provider and the individual End Users. In addition,
the delivery of the intellectual property is usually done “on demand”, i.e., delivery
happens when the End User wants it to happen.
However, the Internet is a very open, insecure medium. Few owners of intellectual
property will be interested in using this medium for distribution if their intellectual
property can be copied and re-distributed during delivery. For this reason, Digital
Rights Management (DRM) systems have been developed to manage the distribu-
tion, and protect the rights of the Content Provider against the actions of malicious
intruders and the malicious actions of legitimate End Users.
DRM systems need to provide two kinds of protection:
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1) Within the delivery medium, it is necessary to ensure that a random malicious
intruder cannot access the digital content. This is “protection before delivery”.
2) Within the End User’s device, it is necessary to ensure that the media stream
cannot be captured and subsequently shared with the End User’s friends or
clients. This is “protection after delivery”.
Protection before delivery is normally provided by cryptographic mechanisms.
The details of such mechanisms are outside the scope of this thesis. Protection after
delivery is normally provided by DRM systems. Ideally, this protection will be “per-
sistent”, i.e., it will last beyond the point in time where the End User has ﬁnished
using the intellectual property. A more precise deﬁnition of our use of “persistent
protection” will be given later in this thesis.
The one-on-one nature of contemporary Content Delivery systems is resource-
intensive for the Content Provider. As the number of customers grows, the eﬀort
required to manage them and to deliver the intellectual property increases linearly,
eventually reaching the point where it is diﬃcult to service all of the requests. For
certain events (e.g., world-level sporting events such as the Olympics, soccer tourna-
ments, cricket tournaments, etc.), it may become impossible to provide the expected
Quality of Service to the End Users. In addition, the Network Service Provider may
have diﬃculty providing suﬃcient bandwidth to the Content Provider to service all
of the requests.
If we take as an example the delivery of video, as the number of End Users
demanding a particular video increases, the disadvantage of making them wait a
short period of time before the presentation starts gets smaller. If the video is for a
real-time event, then of necessity all End Users need the identical video stream. In
these two cases, multicast data distribution (one-to-many relationship) can provide
signiﬁcant resource savings to both the Content Provider and the Network Service
Provider. However, standard Internet Protocol multicast has neither security nor
DRM.
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The initial focus of our work was to answer the questions:
1) what requirements for protection of digital intellectual property are diﬃcult
or impossible to meet when multicast data distribution is used?
2) what approaches can be used to mitigate these diﬃculties?
However, we discovered that there appeared to be no list of requirements for
enforcing Digital Rights Management in the multicast systems. In addition, the
available lists for unicast-based systems were narrowly focused. Therefore, we will
begin our journey by studying in detail many DRM systems such as Microsoft DRM
and Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Digital Rights Management (DRM) 2.0. Next, we
will collect and adopt a list of requirements to achieve the desired beneﬁts for content
media protection in the unicast case. Then we will ﬁnd out what requirements are
diﬃcult or impossible to meet when multicast data distribution is used. Throughout
this thesis the term “content media” is used uniformly to refer to “digital intellectual
property”, “media document”, “digital content” and “digital multimedia”, which are
terms used by other authors to refer to the same concepts.
1.2 Problem Statement
The main goal of this thesis is to design a ﬂexible mechanism, architecture and pro-
tocols, for scalable, scheduled and persistently protected content media delivery.
1.3 Objectives
The main objectives of this research are the following:
• Harden and increase the security of the protection applications that are used to
control the content media access after it was been delivered.
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• Improve the performance and scalability of current DRM systems by changing
the underlying distribution mechanism from unicast into multicast.
1.4 Contributions
We have the following contributions:
• We provide a comparative study of the state-of-the-art proposals in secure and
scalable content delivery.
• We provide a requirement analysis for DRM in multicast content delivery.
• We identify the suﬃcient requirements to enforce persistently protected content
delivery.
• We provide security analysis of Grimen, et al.’s model.
• We elaborate an extension to Grimen, et al.’s model that ﬁxes a vulnerability.
• We propose and validate an architecture that assures ﬂexible, scalable and per-
sistently protected content delivery.
1.5 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, we provide more details about the content media distribution model,
beginning with an introduction to the related beneﬁts of the public content media dis-
tribution. Then, we discuss the security issues with content media delivery, followed
by a description of the DRM system’s basic architecture. Next, we study diﬀerent
types of DRM systems and their limitations. Persistent protection and some infor-
mation about Java mobile code are included in this chapter. Finally, we present the
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DRM attack model. Chapter 3 describes how multicast content media distribution
works by providing IP multicast as an example. We show the advantages and disad-
vantages of IP multicast, analyze IP multicast scalability factors, and describe two
secure multicast models: Multicast Group Security and Multicast Security Architec-
ture. We propose the problem statements in Chapter 4; there, we show the objectives
of our work, and then we draw the road map to address the DRM and secure multicast
problems. In Chapter 5, we start our road map to the proposed solution for the per-
sistent protection in multicast content media delivery by proposing the requirements
for securing both unicast and multicast distributions with persistent protection of the
delivered media. Before proposing our solution, we go through a simple proposal by
Grimen et al. in Chapter 6. It illuminates a promising solution for achieving persis-
tent protection for delivered content media. We validate their proposal and ﬁnd a
hole, for which we propose a solution, and then, based on the model of Grimen et al.,
we propose and validate an improved persistent protection model. In Chapter 7 we
propose the solution for secure multicast distribution with persistent protection; also,
we propose the interaction protocol between main roles of the proposed solution, and
then validate the protocol. Finally, in Chapter 8, we propose an architecture for a
more distributed, scalable and presistent protection of the delivered content media.




If the Internet is to be used to distribute content media, it is necessary to provide
control over this distribution, to ensure that only legitimate End Users can access it,
and only in permitted ways.
In this chapter, we will discuss the services needed to protect the information, and
the architectures of Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems that claim to provide
this protection. We will focus our attention on the idea of persistent protection, which
is one of two areas of concentration for the work of this thesis. Finally, we will give
the attack model for security threats against DRM systems.
2.1 Public Content Distribution
Using the Internet for distributing multimedia contents without any control over the
distributed media is called public distribution. Any user can use public digital content
anytime anywhere as long as the link to the digital content is provided and s/he has
the suitable device that is able to render the digital content [Sys, Che08]. The meaning
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behind free content is: there are no restrictions on the use of free content after being
delivered, so the end user has the right to copy the content and reuse it an unlimited
number of times and s/he can redistribute it to his/her friends, or worse, he may be
able to sell it without getting the permission from the content provider or content
owner [Mar].
In the past, producing physical content media was done by a lot of expensive
technologies. The next stage is to distribute these media. The way of distribution
was through physical media, which gives the publisher some ways of control to protect
physical media, but in the same time it increases the cost of goods, as well as, the
beneﬁciaries of the goods get paid less. The enormous development and progress in
the ﬁeld of networks, as well as providing the possibility to convert many non-digital
products to digital products, and the spread of the Internet and the possibility of
buying and selling via the Internet, all have led many investors to think about using
the Internet to promote the way of distrbuting content media [BA].
Public network which works well with free content distribution is not a good choice
for the investor. They are looking for suitable controlled environment for distributing
the content media. Digital investors are looking for controlling the media distribution
as well as controlling how the media are used. Cryptographic technologies are the
eﬃcient way to control media distribution using a public network, Section 2.2 will give
a good description on that. Controlling the content media to reduce the number of
times to read the content media, restrict the operations allowed on the content media,
or select a time to use the content media cannot be achieved by using encryption
technologies only. Section 2.3 will describe these issues.
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2.2 Security Issues for Content Delivery
The role of the content provider (CP) is to convert analog content media into digital
media. The end user (EU) is the customer who is interested in receiving content
media, and the distribution mechanism is the Internet. The CP needs to control the
delivery of content media to those who are eligible to receive it. The EU eligibility
is determined by the ability of a customer to pay for the use of the content. One
of the most eﬃcient ways to achieve such control via the public network is to use
cryptographic technologies.
Cryptography may be deﬁned as a way of encrypting or hiding plain text using
mathematics to produce protected information or ciphertext. The encryption process
requires key(s). The strength of the encryption technology depends on hiding the key,
not the algorithm. At the same time, if an unauthorized person tries to decrypt the
cipher text without knowing the key, we call this process cryptanalysis. Cryptography
technology covers secrecy, authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation services [BP82,
BEM+07].
A secrecy or conﬁdentiality service allows two or more persons to securely exchange
information without unauthorized disclosure. An authenticity service guarantees the
user that the received message and its source are reliable; at the same time, this
service assures the sender that the end user is reliable as well. An integrity service
provides both the sender and the receiver with conﬁdence that the received message
was not altered along the communication path. A non-repudiation service provides
all parties related to a speciﬁc transaction the assurance that none of them can deny












Figure 1: Asymmetric key encryption
2.2.1 Conﬁdentiality and Secrecy
Conﬁdentiality or secrecy is achieved when two parties are able to protect information
exchanged between them without allowing others to know what has been negotiated,
in other words, the secrecy property is concerned with preventing unwanted people
from snooping around the channel established between two or more parties. In the
Internet world, the secrecy property is achieved using cryptosystems; “the encryption
and decryption [process] is called a cryptosystem” [BEM+07]. The sender encrypts
the message using what is called an encryption key. Then, the receiver decrypts
the protected message using the decryption key. The encryption and decryption
procedures fall under two major models depending on what type of keys they use:
• Asymmetric or Public-key cryptosystems: In the Asymmetric encryption and
decryption models, a public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, every user has two
keys, one public key and one private key. Usually, the public key is known to the
whole world, while the private key must be kept in a private place and should
not be disclosed to anyone but its owner. In fact, the success of this model
depends on keeping the private key hidden. To achieve secrecy, the receiver’s
public key is used to encrypt the message, and the receiver’s private key is
needed for the decryption process. Since the private key is only known by one
person, its owner, the encrypted message can only be decrypted by the owner
[Sta03], see Figure 1.
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If Alice and Bob want to talk with each other using a public transporter, and
Eve is listening to their talk, then, in order to prevent Eve from understanding
their conversation:
– Alice produces and encrypts the messages she wants to send, using Bob’s
public key.
– Alice sends the encrypted message via public transporter.
– Bob receives and decrypts the protected message coming from Alice using
his private key.
– Eve can receive the protected message, but she cannot see its content
because she does not know Bob’s private key.
– Since only Bob knows his private key, this fact partially provides the au-
thenticity of the receiver.
Theoretically, the asymmetric model is computationally more secure than the
symmetric model.
• Symmetric cryptosystems: In the symmetric encryption, both the sender and
the receiver share the same key called secret key; both of them use the same en-
cryption and decryption algorithm as well. This type of secrecy model depends
on keeping the secret key protected from unwanted parties. In symmetric cryp-
tosystems, the sender uses the secret key to encrypt the message he wants to
send resulting in cipher data, and then sends the cipher data into the receiver.
On the other side of the channel, the receiver receives the cipher data and uses
the same secret key along with a corresponding decryption algorithm to decrypt
the cipher data resulting in the original message [Sta03].
If Alice and Bob want to talk with each other using a public transporter, and












Figure 2: Symmetric key encryption
– Alice produces and encrypts the messages she wants to send, using the
shared secret key.
– Alice sends the encrypted message via public transporter
– Bob receives and decrypts the protected message coming from Alice using
the same secret key.
– Eve can receive the protected message, but she cannot see its content
because she does not know Alice and Bob’s shared secret key.
– Since only Alice and Bob know the secret key, this fact provides the au-
thenticity of both the sender and the receiver.
The symmetric model is computationally faster and more eﬃcient than the
symmetric encryption model. The most important problem of this model is that
the secret key distribution is not ﬂexible, as well as, the symmetric encryption
model is less secure than the asymmetric key. See Figure 2.
2.2.2 Hash Function and Authentication Service
Hash function is a one way function where its input is an electronic message
regardless of its length, and its output is a message digest of ﬁxed length. The
digest length ranges between 128 bits and 160 bits. Theoretically, the result
of a hash function is unique for each diﬀerent message. The message digests
could be used as a unique identiﬁer for messages, and that helps the receiver to
authenticate received messages. See Figure 3.
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If Alice and Bob want to talk with each other using a public transporter, and
they want to be assured that the talk integrity is not violated by Eve who is
listening to their talk and can intercept and forward the talk, then, in order to
prevent Eve from violating their conversation:
– Alice produces the hash value of the messages she wants to send.
– Alice encrypts the hash value with the secret key and then sends the en-
crypted hash value along with the message via public transporter.
– Bob receives the protected hash value along with the message and then
decrypts the protected hash value using the same secret key.
– Eve can receive the protected hash value, but she cannot see its content
and she cannot modify the hash value because she does not know Alice
and Bob’s shared secret key.
– Bob generates the hash value of the received message and then compares
the result with the hash value received from Alice. If both are identical,
then that is an indicator that the message integrity is not violated and
that the sender is Alice. In this case, both the message and the sender are
authenticated.
– Since Alice or Bob only can encrypt hash value using their secret key, then
this kind of process provides the authenticity of the source of the message.
Another scenario using public key and hash value for the purpose of authenti-
cation service:
– Alice produces the hash value of the messages she wants to send.
– Alice encrypts the hash value with her private key and then encrypts the
result with Bob’s public key. Afterward, she sends the encrypted hash
value along with the message via public transporter.
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– Bob receives the protected hash value along with the message and then de-
crypts the protected hash value using his private key, then again, decrypts
the result with Alice’s public key.
– Eve can receive the protected hash value, but she cannot see its content
and she cannot modify the hash value because she does not know Bob’s
private key.
– Bob produces the hash value of the received message and then compares
the result with the hash value received from Alice. If both are identical,
then that is an indicator that the message integrity is not violated and
that the sender is Alice, as well as, the receiver is Bob. In this scenario,
the message, the receiver and the sender are authenticated.
– Since Alice only can encrypt hash value using her private key, this pro-
cess called signing the hash value, then this kind of process provides the
authenticity of the source of the message.
In the previous two scenarios, if we need to apply conﬁdentiality service, the
message also needs to be encrypted as has been discussed in Section 2.2.1.
2.2.3 Nonrepudiation Service and Digital Signatures
This service is essential for electronic transactions where both ends, the sender
and the receiver, need undeniable evidence that the transaction is complete
and not forgeable. Digital signature is a mechanism achieved by encrypting a
message, which needs to be signed, by the sender’s private key. Since the private
key is known only to the owner of that key, this gives a proof that the signature
is done by only the owner [Lou00, Sta03]. In other words, “The recipient of a
signed message has proof that the message originated from the sender” or “the
recipient can verify that the message came from the sender” [RSA78].
Since encryption and decryption using public key infrastructure is a heavily








Figure 3: Hash function
digest (MD) that represents the original message and usually the MD is shorter
that the original message, signing the MD is an eﬃcient way to provide non-
repudiation service. The receiver of the signed MD usually receives the original
message that is encrypted via some symmetric-key algorithm, so s/he can pro-
duce the MD of the original message and validate with the received MD [Sta03].
2.2.4 Digital Signature Certiﬁcates
Digital signature certiﬁcates provide a ﬂexible trust framework. Usually, digital sig-
nature certiﬁcates are issued based on public key infrastructure. The most important
role in this trust framework is the certiﬁcate authority (CA), who is responsible for
issuing and managing Digital Certiﬁcates. A digital certiﬁcate contains a customer’s
public key, date of issue, name of the customer, certiﬁcate expiry date and other
information. The customer could be the end user, a company, the content provider,
the merchant and so on. The certiﬁcate is signed by the CA, who is publicly known.
The certiﬁcate authority’s public key should be available; VeriSign organization is an
example of a CA [MRB01].
One single trusted third party works as global or root CA, and the whole world
trusts that entity. Of course, for availability purposes, that single trusted certiﬁcate
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authority needs to be distributed. The global certiﬁcate authority may issue certiﬁ-
cates for other certiﬁcate authorities and thus build a hierarchical framework for trust
service.
Due to the fact that the CA’s public key is universally known, customer’s cer-
tiﬁcates can be easily validated by checking the expiry date of the certiﬁcate. The
customer’s public key can be extracted from the customer’s certiﬁcate, which helps
to build a trust relationship between customers and to secure the path between them.
In the case of exposing the customer’s private key, the corresponding certiﬁcate
needs to be invalidated; the CA periodically publishes the certiﬁcate revocation list
(CRL).
2.3 DRM Systems
In the early years of producing content, the relationship between the content owners
and the content consumers was based on physical objects, e.g., books. The content
publisher, who was responsible for publishing these books, would try to prevent con-
sumers from compromising this service and producing illegal copies. If s/he used
special paper that prevented copiers from producing (illegal) high quality books, the
protection of the content owner was somehow assured [Coy03].
The increasing reliability of the Internet and the advanced technologies used to
generate digital multimedia have changed the distribution methods for multimedia
content from physical forms into digital forms. Examples of digital multimedia con-
tent (e-audio, e-video, e-image, e-book, etc.), “e” stands for electronic. This new
technology draws intelligent artists’ attention, converting their “tangible” [PBW02]
intellectual property into equivalent digital forms and then advertising their innova-
tions to the whole world at small cost, knowing that millions of customers can easily
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connect to the Internet and ask for the content media. The fact that many customers
are attracted to get the content media using easy connections cheaply, will increase
the demand on the content distribution service. Flexibility in this context means that
the end user only needs to use his own machine to access digital content rather than
going to a theater or a digital store to search for speciﬁc media and then watch it.
Compared with a content distribution service for “tangible” intellectual property,
a digital service has the potential to increase the content producer’s proﬁt. However,
it has the disadvantage that a person (paying subscriber or not) can get a copy of
the content and start to re-distribute it. This has led to the idea of generating Dig-
ital Rights Management (DRM) systems, which are intended to protect the content
producer’s rights to distribute the content, and thus retain his/her proﬁts.
Content distribution has traditionally been based on a one-to-one relationship
between the content provider and the end user. These two parties agree (implicitly or
explicitly) on the mechanism(s) to be used (in the content server, on the wire, and in
the receiving host) to protect the digital content from various threats, whether they
come during data transmission, or after the data have arrived at the receiver.
The management of the digital rights has been the direct responsibility of the
content provider. The resources of the Network Service Provider have been used
solely to “move the data”. The only negotiation required between the content server
and the network has been to ensure that the necessary resources are available to
deliver the required Quality of Service, using, for example, the Resource Reservation
Protocol (RSVP) [RB97].
Some rights are applicable for digital assets/roles and others are not. In the
following lines, we will show examples of some digital assets/roles and their applicable
rights:
• License (create, modify, distribute, redistribution).
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• Digital content media (oﬄine/online play, replay, modify, forward, super-distribution)
• Roles (CP, EU, LP, monitor).
• Digital document (view, write, print, delete, forward)
• Teleconference (join, leave, add members, delete members, authenticate)
2.3.1 DRM Architecture
The generic DRM architecture consists of three players: content provider (CP), li-
cense provider (LP) and end user (EU), see Figure 4. The CP is mainly in charge
of generating the content media, then protecting the content media by encrypting it
using well known encryption algorithms. In some cases, the CP may use a proprietary
or closed encryption algorithm, and that may not be acceptable in the commercial
world. Usually, for commercial use, cryptography technology hides encryption and
decryption keys but not encryption and decryption algorithms. We strongly believe
that in the military use, both encryption and decryption algorithms as well as encryp-
tion and decryption keys are hidden[Sav02]. CP generates meta-data, which contains
some useful information such as the place where to get the encrypted media, which
algorithm to decrypt the content media and where to obtain the decryption key, and
so on. The CP attaches meta-data along with each encrypted content (protected con-
tent). The meta-data guides the consuming device to the location of the LP, i.e., where
to acquire a license. The CP provides the LP with corresponding content encryption
keys (CEK). The LP is mainly responsible for creating permissions (licenses), which
include terms and conditions, as well as the CEK for enabling the consuming device
to expose the corresponding hidden content. EU downloads the hidden content via
local software called a DRM agent (DA), which is designed to enforce usage policies.
The DA extracts the information pointing to the LP from the meta-data, negotiates
with the LP for providing licenses according to user’s payment amount, downloads the
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Figure 4: DRM generic interactions
license, checks the integrity and the validity of the license, interprets the license, ex-
tracts the CEK and enforces the terms and conditions [Ltd02, Ars, OMA08b, Cor08].
In most of the DRM systems, hidden contents can be publicly reached either from
the CP or via another peer device (super-distribution). However, the license ﬁle that
allows the completion of the rendering process for any distinct content must be paid
for. Therefore, controlling and managing the license helps the content owners.
DRM technology is deployed in three levels (application, operating system and
hardware [AH04]). In Section 2.3.2, we will talk about two successful DRM products
belonging to Microsoft, which deploy DRM in operating system and application level:
Windows media rights manager (WMRM) and the successor Windows Rights Man-
agement Services (RMS). Then we will go through a successful DRM system, mainly
applied for mobile phones, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), which deploys DRM at
both application and hardware level.
2.3.2 Diﬀerent types of DRM systems
Windows media right manager (WMRM) is a Microsoft tool that allows the CP
to protect any content media, and it allows him to send and receive the protected


































































Figure 5: Windows media rights manager ﬂow [Cor04a].
the content media with a selected key, then the encrypted media is packaged with
useful information such as media version. The resulting protected content is ready
to be distributed and delivered to any client via a distributor server. See Figure 5.
The client who wants to watch any protected content, needs to get a license from
the clearing house and licensing server, which contains license key seed and key id,
for more information see [Cor04a]. Rights Management Services (RMS) is a product
developed by Microsoft as well, there are some diﬀerences in the two products.
WMRM provides an economical and feasible solution for hiding the digital media;
it does not need any special hardware to hide the content. In contrast, RMS may need
such hardware. Both technologies (we will call them Microsoft DRM or MSDRM)
support multiple access control models, such as:
• The number of times the end user is permitted to use the protected media
[Cor04a].
• The starting time to use the content media [Cor04a].
• Is the end user allowed to copy the content media [Cor04a].
• “Document expiration” [MT08].
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• “Access content programmatically” [MT08].
Microsoft released operating systems that allow Microsoft DRM to be run through
a variety of devices such as personal computers, notebooks, PDAs, smart-phones and
pocket PC [Cor04b, Cen]. WMRM as well as RMS are end-to-end DRM solutions.
They used cryptographic mechanisms to securely distribute the content media. When
a client receives any protected media, s/he cannot directly decrypt it, the client needs
to use what is called DRM application, which is responsible for contacting the clearing
house and license server and get a license, which is capability given to an eligible client
to get access to a protected content. The application DRM afterward is capable of
decrypting protected content and rendering it [Cor04b, Cen].
Microsoft builds a secure environment via software application; application uses
proprietary mechanisms that encrypt and decrypt content media. Each end-user
virtually has a unique instance of that application, this process is called individual-
ization. The application uses a secure path to the hardware driver used to render the
content media. If an instance of this proprietary application is hacked a revocation
process is used to revoke that instance. This kind of individualization supports ma-
chine authentication [JPKJ06, Arn07]. There is no provided information that tells us
that WMRM supports user authentication but RMS does [16w, Ros05].
For each enterprise, there is a certiﬁed RMS server used for registration purposes,
the RMS system considers this server to be a root server. The registering RMS
server signs up each client’s device; it has the chance to register other servers. In the
Microsoft RMS system, each client needs to use a DRM controller and his account
certiﬁcation in order to enable DRM. RMS may authenticate enterprise internal users
as well as external users (users who do not belong to the same enterprise) as long as
they use either active directory server or a .NET Passport account [Ros05].
MSDRM uses the “individualization” technique, which generates a unique in-
stance of the software player, and binds each instance to a speciﬁc customer machine,
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therefore, each player is supposed to work only on a speciﬁc machine. It also supports
revocation service as counterattack if individualized software instance is compromised.
More information on these two services is available on the Microsoft website [Mic].
The WMRM player is software and it is susceptible to modiﬁcation or replacement
attacks. These attacks are achieved by obstructing or modifying the enforcement part
of the rendering code with an attacker-made code, and thus bypassing the checking
points. Another attack was created by one software cracker. He analyzed the WMRM
code and then produced a tool called “FreeMe”, which tracks the location of encryp-
tion keys located inside the blackbox ﬁle (used to hide these keys) and then exposed
hidden media ﬁles [Scr01, JM07]. WMRM does not provide real privacy preservation
for end users; neither does RMS (R6). There is no reported attack against the RMS
system but the behavior of the system indicates that it is susceptible to a software
reverse engineering attack.
The Open Mobile Alliance DRM-2 (OMA-DRM-2) [All, Irw04] is a speciﬁcation
and standard designed for enabling the control of digital services on diﬀerent mobile
phones and personal players. OMA DRM2 architecture has three major components:
content issuer (CI), rights issuer (RI) and a DRM agent (DA). The CI generates a
content encryption key (CEK) either for each individual content medium or multiple
contents, and may encrypt selective contents. It then packages each of them in a
secure container; this container is grouped and packaged into the DRM Content
Format (DCF). The DCF may contain more than one container, Figure 6 shows the
DCF structure [All]. OMA-DRM-2 supports a small-size content DCF (picture, ring
and small messages) as well as a large-size (audio and video content), they call it
Packetized-DCF (PDCF). The CI negotiates the rules and constraints for DCF usage
with RI. CI delivers DCF to customer machine via various transport mechanisms,
s/he does not need to use a secure connection since the DFC is already secured.























































































Figure 6: Data content format structure [All, Cor08]
and agrees on terms and conditions and the price for consuming that content, the
SIM card that is attached to the mobile phone authenticates the user. Afterward, the
DA, which plays the tamper resistant role residing in a mobile station, requests the
protected content. DA downloads a DCF, checks its integrity and extracts the infor-
mation that triggers it to send a rights request to the RI. When it receives the rights
object (RO), it veriﬁes the authenticity of RI and RO as well as RO’s integrity, all
authentication activities happen through rights object acquisition protocol (ROAP)
[Irw04]. By then, DA extracts the keys (KEK) from RO and decrypts the protected
contents within DCF/PDCF.
The LP creates a suitable rights object (RO) for each DCF. The RO works like
a license. When the DA requests an RO, the LP authenticates the DA and protects
the RO, which is achieved by encrypting the part containing KEK with target DA’s
public key and then signing the RO. This means if an adversary accesses this RO,
s/he cannot access the KEK because of not having the corresponding private key.
The RO is an XML ﬁle containing DCF encryption keys and expresses the rules and
constraints for using the DCF as being expressed by the CI.
The DA enables the content rendering process and controls its usage rules. The
DA is a trusted component in the mobile phone; it has a unique public/private key
and a certiﬁcate [MST05, Med03], which helps the LP to authenticate the DA. The
DA is designed in a way that it should receive both DCF/PDCF and the associated
rights object in order to render protected content; it checks and governs the treatment
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of the DRM content by enforcing the rights stated in the rights object. The keys in the
Rights object are encrypted with the DA’s public key. This process binds the rights
object to a speciﬁc DRM agent and only that target agent can expand the encryption
key out of the rights object. It is possible that DA redistributes a protected container
to another friend’s machine (super-distribution), the receiving machine’s DA will start
a new RO acquisition process for the received DCF. This super-distribution decreases
the extensive overload on CP and improves the availability of the service.
OMA DRM-2 supports the domain concept, which allows the sharing of RO to a
group of domain registered devices; this allows them to view the same contents using
the shared RO.
Mobile phones have unique embedded proprietary hardware speciﬁcations, and
each user has to use a special smart card, which supports the device with an address
number, therefore, user/device identiﬁcation, authentication and payment are reli-
able. Embedded hardware works as a tamper-resistant hardware and it provides the
trust to the LP [KC04, MD03].
Internet Stream Media Alliance Encryption and Authentication (ISMACryp) is
successfully used for trading by generating a controllable streamed service for high
quality media content such as video and audio. The main purpose of this service is
to preserve interoperability, especially when DRM is applied to the ISMA scheme.
ISMACryp is being built in the application layer [Doe07]. The ISMA architecture
consists of four parties: the mastering, key/license MGT, the sender and the receiver
[ISM06, PJK06], see Figure 7.
The mastering is responsible for equipping the content for distribution; it has the
option to encrypt the media content and specify the usage rights, which helps it to
work as a clerk, or it may provide the encryption key to the sender and the sender
will do the encryption part. ISMA uses “Advanced Encryption Standard Counter
Mode” (AES-CTR) for protecting the content media [Hou04]. Mastering may get the
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Figure 7: ISMA DRM architecture [ISM06]
encryption key from the key/license MGT or provide the key whenever it is needed.
In the scenario where the encrypting of the media is done by the mastering entity,
the sender is not aware of the encryption key; it has no job but to send the protected
media whenever it is needed to the customers. Finally, mastering is responsible for
advertising for the content media.
The sender is responsible either to encrypt the content media or receive the pro-
tected media from the mastering entity, and then stream it to the receiver; the dis-
tribution mechanism for the streamed protected content is the real-time transport
protocol (RTP) [Doe07, PJK06]. The sender has the option to predict the encryption
key by following the same procedures that are given to a user by the key/license
MGT, and then generate the protected media. The media could be saved in a ﬁle
before it is being streamed or streamed directly from the sender.
The key/license MGT is responsible for generating suitable licenses according to
the granted rights; the license authorizes ISMA users to use the protected content me-
dia. It contains the two main components: the decryption key and the usage rights.
For interoperability issues, ISMA tries to include all types of licensing schemes. If
the responsibility for creating the key encryption is on the key/license MGT, then it
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may generate that key depending on some properties of the receiving entity, which
are used for authenticating the receiver. The ISMACryp uses the secure real-time
transport protocol to authenticate protected content and uses existing key manage-
ment standards, which provides the ﬂexibility for the content provider to chose which
key management he is going to use [ISM06].
The ISMA framework supports three types of receivers: ISMA-only-receiver, MPEG-
receiver and IPMP-X receiver [ISM06]. The ﬁrst type represents the receivers who
play streamed MPEGmedia, the second represents the receiver that can play streamed
data or stored ﬁles of type MPEG-4, and the last one represents the receiver that
can parse and process Intellectual Property Management and Protection Extension
(IPMP-X) format. The rendering software on the receiver side is responsible for con-
tacting the sender and key/license MGT, authenticating both of them, acquiring and
authenticating the license. ISMACryp uses the secure real-time protocol (SRTP) for
integrity checking, accessing the proper decryption key for the protected content me-
dia and enforcing the usage rights. The receiver’s rendering software has the option
to decrypt, authenticate and check the validity of the control ﬂow between the sender
and the receiver. The receiver’s rendering software enforces the usage rights [ISM06].
In the ISMACryp speciﬁcation, the protected media are decrypted only just before
they are decoded by the rendering software [Doe07].
ISMACryp supports super-distribution by providing the ability to OMA-DRM2
compliant devices to store streamed media into DFC/FDFC ﬁle format. Then, the
compliant device can super-distribute the content to other friends’ devices. That will
increase the availability of the service as well as decrease the load on the sender server.
Again, those devices should acquire a license in order to play forwarded content media
[ISM06].
It is known that using a public key infrastructure for hiding data is robust, but it
is ineﬃcient, especially to protect real-time streaming media. For eﬃciency purpose,
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the ISMACryp framework uses a symmetric algorithm for data encryption, authenti-
cation, and integrity purposes. ISMACryp has the option to change the mechanisms
used to for encryption, authenticating and checking the validity of the message sent
via this system [ISM06].
2.4 Persistent Protection
Encryption technology, alone, is not enough to protect content media [AH04, Mar].
The main purpose of the DRM system is to guarantee persistent protection for de-
livered media [LSNS03]; in another words, DRM systems are designed to guard in-
tellectual property against digitally related criminal actions. DRM systems allow
intellectual property owners to embed control within the delivered products.
DRM systems can be deﬁned as cooperative and organized eﬀorts among trusted
entities and tools in order to achieve persistent control over digital products [PBW,
Tec, Int]. The phrase “persistent control” is used to imply control over a suﬃcient
period of time but not forever. After a certain period of time, the content may become
available for free, not because the owners of the copyright have given it up, but rather,
because they have stopped enforcing it. This is because the cost of satisfying demands
for new copies is more than the content producers’ revenues, and they have already
achieved suﬃcient returns on their investments [PBW02, AH04, Hua07].
The word persistent means “refusing to give up” or “persevering obstinately”
[Ans], which means that the persistency is valid at any time and any place. Persistent
protection, in this context, means to obstinately protect the digital content from
digital piracy at a place that is outside the content provider’s ownership. However,
persistent protection at any time and any place seems to be impossible. After some
time, this persistency will decay due to the fact that the secret used to hide such
content will not remain a secret forever. We will relax the deﬁnition of persistent
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protection by providing the environmental conditions and the time period in which
persistency is to be valid.
Liu et al. [LSNS03] suggest that persistent protection is gained by encrypting
content media using a cryptography system; then, a distinctive identiﬁcation needs
to be assigned to the rendering device. This identiﬁcation is used for authentication
purposes. A license that embeds the decryption key(s), as well as the usage rights,
needs to be issued to the rendering device. Finally, software-based or hardware-based
protection must be used to enforce usage rights that are embedded in the acquired
license.
Chin-Ling Chen [Che08] has expressed that persistent protection of delievered
media content is achieved by individualizing the end user’s machine and employing a
digital certiﬁcate.
Most of the software-based and hardware-based protection used by many com-
panies today does not support standard or common implementation. They use a
proprietary implementation and design called a closed system [Che08].
2.4.1 Hardware Based Protection
Hardware-based protection is intended to protect software programs from piracy and
tampering and to protect user’s private digital information from unauthorized use
and distribution, thus protect user’s privacy. One example of a successful hardware-
based protection system used to exchange digital products is smart cards. The smart
card system is an integrated circuit used as a portable token that embeds a secure
crypto-processor, random access memory (RAM), and a secure ﬁle system to protect
cryptographic data such as a secret key. The design of the smart card is considered
proprietary, and the secure ﬁle system contains private information about the end
user for identiﬁcation and authentication purposes [SSK04, Cle, Smab, Smaa].
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Smart phones with OMA DRM2 speciﬁcations represent another example of the
successful use of hardware-based protection. DRM Agents, as described in the OMA
DRM Architecture speciﬁcation [All06], embed unique private/public key pairs and
certiﬁcates, which are used to identify and authenticate mobile devices and to indi-
vidualize the acquired right objects for that device.
Trusted computing platform alliance (TCPA), or trusted computing group (TCG),
provides a speciﬁcation for trusted computing environments and protocols that is
composed of trusted hardware, BIOS, trusted OS kernel, self encrypting storage, and
trusted anti-virus software. TCG speciﬁcation provides three access privileges:
• Privileged access[TCPA members only].
• Underprivileged access [platform owner].
• Unprivileged access [non-TCPA applications].
In the TCG, the following components are essential for enforcing DRM usage
rights and security policies: Cryptographic operations, such as public and secret key
encryption; key store; key management; and secure booting process [Gro07].
The main problem with hardware-based protection is that it is not easy to replace
once it has been hacked.
2.4.2 Software-Based Protection
Software-based protection needs to be individualized in order to prevent it from work-
ing on more than one device. For example, each instance of Apple’s Fairplay player
embeds the hardware information of the device that is supposed to launch it; this
is called individualization via binding hardware information. Microsoft media rights
manager is another example of individualization via binding hardware information,
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wherein the player with Windows Media Rights Manager uses DLL ﬁles, which are
individualized for the distinct player that is supposed to run on a speciﬁc computer.
The individualization process is achieved by generating a unique DLL ﬁle that is
embedded with the computer hardware’s unique identiﬁer and private key. When
the clearing house issues a license to a particular computer, it is encrypted with the
related public key. Thus, the only machine that can use the license is the one with
the right private key [LSNS03].
The license provider or clearing house, in turn, individualizes any acquired license
by encrypting the media key with a speciﬁc DRM player’s public key and then embeds
the encrypted media key within the license. This process is called individualization
via binding certiﬁcate [Che08]. The advantage of binding a license to a unique player
is that it prevents the license from being transferable.
The individualisation process gives the content provider the power to make the
digital content work under speciﬁc individualized DRM components [LSNS03].
The most important thing here is that the DRM enabled application must be
tamper resistant in order to enhance the reliability of the playing machine. Rights
enforcement is one part of the DRM enabled software that runs in the user’s machine
that needs to be protected from any modiﬁcation, replacement or discarding. By
employing a tamper resistant object, we make it more diﬃcult for the software to
be modiﬁed, replaced or discarded. Some companies use proprietary encryption and
decryption algorithms, which are not tested and may not be trustworthy or eﬃcient
[LSNS03, LSNS03]; this is called security via obscurity. Other companies employ code
obfuscation techniques in order to hide the logic of the obfuscated software.
The antiscreen capture program is another example of the successful use of software-
based protection, which has the ability to prevent the end user from capturing sen-
sitive information at the application level; this protection works at the operating
system level [LSNS03].
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The main problem with software-based protection is that it is susceptible to reverse
engineering and dynamic and static analysis attacks by software experts.
2.4.3 Code Obfuscation
The code obfuscation process is used to make software codes hard to guess by human
or reverse engineering processes, as well as harder to modify. It is important to
note that code obfuscation does not alter original code functionality or logic; in
other words, the code is obfuscated, but gives the same results as the original code.
However, usually the performance of obfuscated code is degraded [EDB04, CT02,
Low98].
The reverse engineering process dumps the executable binary code from a ma-
chines’s memory, then interprets the code into assembly code, which called disassem-
bly process, and then extracts a higher-level structure from the assembly code, which
called decompilation process [LD03]. Figure 8 depicts the reverse engineering process.
The main goal of the obfuscation process is to add more complication and cost, as
much as we can, to the static disassembling and decompilation processes. However,
forever secure obfuscation algorithms are impossible.
Code obfuscation is categorized into three types [Low98]:
• Layout Obfuscation: this process is achieved by changing the variables’ and
functions’ name into meaningless names.
• Data Obfuscation: this process may achieved by changing the scope of data
structure variables, or changing the variable location, or data encoding or even
data ordering.
• Control Obfuscation: this process is achieved by changing or hiding the control
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Figure 8: Reverse engineering process
ﬂow and/or control computations of the original control ﬂow graph.
Code obfuscation can be done using techniques used to increase instruction level
parallelism such as software pipeline, and code unrolling technologies [HP07].
2.4.4 Mobile Code
Mobile code is a piece of software that has the ability to run on the target machine
regardless of the platform. In the distributed system, this approach is called code
migration, and it is useful for increasing performance, reducing the network band-
width and improving load balancing. The following three examples show the beneﬁt
of process migration [TS02, RLMR00]:
• If a process wants to use resources that exist in another machine or wants to
do heavy computation on a machine that does not have enough resources, then
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migrating the process to the other machine with enough resources will lead to
increase the performance.
• Sometimes, a process needs to use large amount of data that exists on another
side of the network, and that process only wants to compute the summary out
of this data. In this case, instead of moving the data from one place to another
place which will overload the network, it is better to migrate the process itself
to the other side of the network and then do the computation and return the
summary. We assume that the size of the mobile process is small.
• If a machine is heavily loaded with many processes, and that machine is part
of the distributed system, then migrating some processes from heavy loaded
machine to another machine that is not loaded will help to improve the load
balancing and the performance as well.
Mobile code technology allows a process to run on diﬀerent hosts: Java applet is a
good example and mobile agent is another example. The least necessary condition to
run a Java applet program is Java enabled platform or Java enabled browser [GA98].
Java platform easily allows the Java class or applet migration from one host to another
host; for this situation, a Java applet/class may be prepared in a way to circumvent
target machine stability. For security purposes, Java applet/class needs to be veriﬁed,
authenticated, authorized and controlled [RLMR00, DD00].
Any illegal changes of any system state sometimes considered an attack. In order
to make sure there is no attack, we could employ integrity checker for the important
ﬁle systems. The consequences of any system that is under attack may include system
ﬁles modiﬁcation or deletion or sending user’s private information via network [GA98].
The main reason behind the ability of executing Java ﬁles on any devices is that
the Java architecture supports Java code mobility and platform independence. The
result of compiling Java source code is an intermediate language called Java bytecode,
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Figure 9: Java virtual machine
Figure 10: Java virtual machine [Pat08]
and any Java bytecode can be executed on any machine that has Java virtual machine
(JVM). See Figure 9, Figure 10 and Figure 11.
As stated by Gritzalis and Aggeli [GA98], Java bytecode is an architecture in-
dependent object, which means that Java byte code can run on any platform that
supports JVM. The main components of the Java virtual machine are [Pat08]:
• The Stack, which contains local variables, execution environment and operand
stack.
• Garbage-collected Heap, which holds Java objects.
• Method Area, which holds Java bytecode.
• Program Counter.
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Figure 11: Java virtual machine components [Pat08]
• Registers.
One of the important issues that needs to be considered when transferring Java
bytecode is security. Java bytecode needs to be authenticated and authorized before
it runs on a speciﬁc machine. For that issue a trust relationship via signing model
is built between Java code producer and consumer. The generator of a Java code
digitally signs it, which enables the client to authenticate and check the Java code
integrity [RLMR00, HB01].
A restricted environment called a sandbox is used. Sandbox is a construct used to
control Java applets. The sandbox has a range of customizable access control starting
from a simple sandbox that accesses the standard input/output and its memory space,
to a sandbox that can access all resources in the target host [RLMR00, HB01]. The
sandbox contains a bytecode veriﬁer, an applet class loader and a security manager.
The bytecode veriﬁer checks the bytecode to see whether it is vulnerable to security
attack or not. Applet class loader loads applet code and all related objects into the
host memory. The security manager checks all applet operations that need to be
perfomed by the host CPU, and if there is a security attack, then it stops the action
[San].
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Java 1.2 architecture is an extensible and comprehensive security framework and
has many features and mechanisms, such as security policy, access permissions, pro-
tection domain and ﬁne grain access control. A new service has been added to Java 1.2
called Java authentication and authorization service (JAAS), which works as authen-
tication framework and it is responsible for authenticating users and authorizing their
permission. In Java 1.2, every user has an identity based on some sort of evidence.
Java 1.2 allows to deﬁne set of protected resources and terms or conditions, which are
used to verify identiﬁed users to use them. JAAS policy used to state permissions
to users. java.security.SecurityManager along with java.security.AccessController dy-
namically enforces access control [LG99].
The Java platform introduces APIs for main security services such as symmetric
and asymmetric cryptography infrastructure, authentication and authorization ser-
vices, secure communication services; ex, secure session layer (SSL), and ﬁne grain
access control. The Java platform supports interoperability and it is easily extendable
to support new services [(SD05].
Now we come to the more challenging security problem, which is protecting mobile
code from any malicious hosting target. In some cases, mobile codes may hold some
private information such as a private key. This private information needs to be
protected from being exposed. Mobile code may be subject to forwarding to another
target. In this case it is subject to owner impersonation. Mobile code is subject to
modiﬁcation [RLMR00, HB01].
In summary, Java platform supports protection for hosting machine against mobile
malicious code.
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2.5 DRM Attack Model
Information security developers are concerned about countering threats. In this sec-
tion, we will discuss threats that content distribution services are facing.
Since DRM developers have found that the easiest way to develop a DRM system
is to consider that the end users’ devices are trusted, therefore the most important role
in the DRM system is the role of DRM agent (DA), which enforces the compliance to
the content owner(s)/publisher(s) deﬁnition of legal activities on the content media.
The DA controls the use of protected content media by burying secret keys used to
decrypt that content, i.e., the DA works to provide a protection against piracy. The
software and hardware attackers try to break the DA by exposing these keys and gain
access to the clear content media.
Deploying a DRM software solution within generic machines is viable and cost
eﬀective, but it is susceptible to various attacks and it degrades the system perfor-
mance. Normally, because DRM processes reside in customer-machines’ memory,
attackers can physically access to these memories, thereby, they can reverse engineer,
disassemble and decompile binary codes inside these memories and then extract sen-
sitive information used for content media hiding. Or, they can dynamically monitor
process execution and follow the pointers to the location of secret keys [YKM+06]. In
addition, a software solution may carry a serious attack against a customer, specially
when it works as a virus spying for private information [FH06].
We consider DRM hardware solution as a black box, which hides sensitive secrets
and prevents them from being released. This depends on the fact that the attacker
has little knowledge about that box’s internal structure, and the existing tools’ ca-
pabilities are too limited to catch much useful information. Therefore, tampering
with such hardware is too limited. This makes it a promising solution for future
trusted computing [SV01]. Unfortunately, this solution is not economically feasible
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Table 1: DRM Software and Hardware
DRM SW solution DRM HW solution
Attack easy: hard:
tools are available need special tools
Fix reinstall new replace or repatch
version HW component
other Needs more power surges &
problems computational cost costly installation
Table 2: Attack Cost
Tools cost Knowledge availability Time availability Attack cost
Low Reverse engineering Limited Less expensive
Low Reverse engineering Open Low
Low Available Limited Medium
Low Available Open Very Low
Expensive Available Limited Very expensive
Expensive Available Open Expensive
Expensive Reverse engineering Limited Very expensive
Expensive Reverse engineering Open Expensive
for existing PCs. Table 1 shows a comparison between DRM software and hardware
[EDB04].
If the attacker has the right tools, a good experience and knowledge, as well as
enough time, then s/he has a better chance to successfully attack the content distri-
bution model. In contrast, if the tools used to circumvent the content distribution
model are expensive enough, the knowledge about the technology used to protect
digital assets is limited as well as the time to accomplish the attack is restricted by
enforceable limitations, then s/he will have diﬃculty to attack the model. Table 2
shows attack costs for a variety of scenarios.
In software-based environments, the end user “owns” the environment where the
rendering of the content takes place and the memory that holds the digital data as
37
well as the mechanism used to enforce the content owner’s rights, which allows the end
user to trace the place of the encryption key or modify the enforcement/ protection
mechanism [BA, MVJDD05, GMM06b, GMM06c].
To conclude, the DRM systems seem to be reasonably strong, however they face
the following threats [FH06, HB05b, EDB04]:
• All threats that are faced by transmitting data through insecure channels are
applied to the DRM agent software, e.g., data eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle
and modiﬁcation attack.
• Reverse engineering of the DRM agent in order to deduce the location where
the sensitive data reside.
• Monitoring the system behavior at run-time in order to observe the data changes
in memory locations, so the attacker can predict sensitive secrets hidden inside
the memory.
• Modifying the DRM software that is used to enforce usage policies, and then
bypassing the enforcement point.
• Modifying the license in such a way as to allow customers to use fake rights.
• General operating systems suﬀer from many security holes. In MS-Windows OS,
attackers have physical access to the machine’s memory and disk, and are able
to hide their spy-ware and dangerous ﬁles [HB05b], which helps the attacker to
spy without being caught.
• DRM application may enable private information spying [FH06].
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2.6 Summary
DRM systems control and manage the distribution of the content media. Mainly,
it uses two levels of control, the ﬁrst on the network level, and the second on the
application level. In this chapter, we discussed the techniques used to provide the
following services in the network level: conﬁdentiality, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation and digital signatures. DRM systems use two approaches to provide
protection on the application level, they are: hardware based protection and software
based protection. We showed DRM architecture and some means to control the use
of the content media after delivery. DRM system implementations are based on long-
term same protection techniques and unicast distribution, which makes it susceptible
to modiﬁcation or replacement attacks, specially when software-based protection is
used. A typical DRM system is not scalable when the number of customers exceeds
the capacity of the NSP and/or the CP. We are searching for ways allow us to increase
the diﬃculty of attacking protection programs and the scalability of the used DRM
model. What we miss at this stage is to identify a comprehensive set of requirements
that cover basic DRM functionalities. In this thesis, we will investigate general DRM




In the generic DRM architecture, the NSP takes no active role. It only provides a
means of communication among the CP, LP and EU. As long as the network capacity
is suﬃcient and exceeds the expectation of the End Users, and the capacity of the
Content Server is suﬃcient, the existing DRM model is feasible. However, it is based
on a one-to-one relationship. As the demands of the End Users grow, the linearly-
increasing load will reach a point where the expectations of the End Users will grow
beyond the capacity of the network or the Content Server to meet it. This is the
scalability problem. If we could schedule the delivery of the highly-demanded services,
then a promising solution is to shift from unicast to a multicast delivery mechanism.
In this chapter, we will outline the properties, advantages and disadvantages of
multicast data delivery, and then summarize two existing approaches to providing
security within multicast systems.
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Figure 12: Multicast architecture
3.1 Multicast Data Distribution
It is known that multicast as a distribution mechanism has the advantages of lowering
the price of distribution, speeding up the delivery process, lowering the resource usage
of both the source and network and improving the network bandwidth [J. 07]. This
introduces the possibility of enhancing the scalability of a system by shifting the
traditional DRM technologies from a one-to-one relationship, between the sender and
the receiver, into a one-to-many relationship. Figure 12 shows the distribution ﬂow of
the multicast architecture; the arrows, in the ﬁgure, reﬂect that there is one copy of
data ﬂow sourced from one sender to many receivers. Scheduled service works along
with multicast, and by decreasing the delivery cost, will bring a motivating factor for
the content media distributor to gain more from this distribution model.
The generic multicast model is good for free distribution when there is no need
for control over the distributed content media. Multicast, as a technology, is widely
used for applications that require fast response time and high quality. It requires
fewer resources from the sender and the network and saves network bandwidth, in
addition to reducing the provider’s and network’s CPU processing cycles, which leads
to less delivery delay and cost [J. 07, IA06]. Most importantly, it scales up group
communication, especially when the number of potential group members is large
enough, and if they are connected through few Network Service Providers (NSP(s)).
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Thus, it reduces the content server’s load to the minimum. For group communication,
the sender should synchronize with all group members to make multicast worthwhile.
Existing IP Multicast follows IGMP/MLD protocols as follows [Cai02, Kos98]:
1- A group manager creates a multicast group using a speciﬁc IP address (Class
D).
2- A customer who wishes to join a group sends a join message (IGMP/MLD) to
the nearest multicast-enabled router. IGMP/MLD is a protocol used to manage
multicast group membership. The data sent to group members is called group-
data.
3- A customer who is no longer interested in the group-data sends a leave request.
4- Intermediate routers, that happen to be in the path between the sender and
receivers, collaboratively build a multicast distribution tree based on join and
leave messages. Routers can use any multicast routing protocol.
5- Intermediate routers know how to forward group-data to all receivers.
6- If any edge router receives a new join message, it extends the multicast tree if
needed.
7- Once the multicast routing tree is created, group-data, sent by any sender, will
be received by all group members.
8- A router responsible for forwarding group-data to that receiver checks whether
there are any other receivers connected to that branch; if not, it truncates itself
from the multicast tree; after that, no group-data will be received by that edge.
Multicast is a technology for delivering the same data packets to millions of people
who are synchronized to receive them. In doing so, it hides the identities of all users
from the sender. Replacing the on-demand service of normal DRM systems with
42
scheduled service results in the identities of all users being hidden from the original
sender. This saves a lot of packets on the network, as well as requiring the content
provider to produce and deliver only one copy of the content media.
Multicast allows the achievement of orders of magnitude better performance on
the scalability requirement than the unicast model. The drawback is that once the
media are delivered, there will be no control on the receiver side. IP multicast does not
provide any security measures for the delivered media. Also, it does not preserve the
end user’s privacy and does not include any accounting or access control mechanisms
over digital assets.
The advantages of using IP multicast did not motivate content providers to use
it as a distribution mechanism because it only oﬀers free join and does not monitor
the sending process or restrict the receiving process. In other words, the content
providers cannot control their contents’ distribution[IA06]. Let us study the distinc-
tive properties (factors) that contribute to the scalability of the IP multicast scheme:
F1 Separation of concern.
When a problem becomes more complex, the most eﬀective way to deal with it
is to divide it into sub-problems, solve these sub-problems and then gather the sub-
solutions. When a sub-problem is assigned to an individual role, this procedure is
called “separation of concern” in the software engineering process. DRM developers
use this concept in their design; they physically separate the content media from the
authorization mechanism in a distributed manner [VMF99]. The IP multicast generic
architecture consists of three roles: the sender, interconnecting networks (routers) and
receivers. IP multicast separates the sending process from the distribution process,
the distribution process from delivering process and the delivering process from the
registration process; the sending process is done by the sender, the distribution tree
is generated by cooperative intermediate routers, the registration process as well as
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the delivering process is managed by multicast-enabled routers at the edge of the net-
work. The sender of group data is concerned about creating the group and sending
the data that belong to those group members (group data). The interconnecting net-
works, routers, are concerned with building the multicast distribution tree, copying,
forwarding and delivering the group data at the network level. Routers in the multi-
cast case keep more information than in the unicast case, e.g., sender address, group
address and output port [VAD99]. Receivers show their interest to receive or stop-
receiving the transmitted group data by sending (IGMP/MLD) join/leave requests.
Thus those parties have to collaborate with each other to perform the multicast dis-
tribution. In general, for a complicated interactions, it is advised to divide it into a
set of cooperating interactions and apply the separation of concern concept, which
introduces the scalability, ﬂexibility and simplicity to the solution.
F2 Resource reduction.
The number of packets traveling inside the network using the IP multicast model
is smaller than in the unicast case. Suppose we want to send a data ﬁle to a group
of users; having created a shared distribution tree for each sender in a multicast case
will deﬁnitely improve network bandwidth, since sending N copies of packets to N
customers in the unicast case is replaced by one copy of packets using the shared
distribution tree. In the multicast model, the multicast enabled routers replicate
packets belonging to a group of users and forward them through their appropriate
ports. In the unicast case, if a router happens to be in the path between the sender
and N receivers, it will forward the same packet N times. The multicast mechanism
provides a good solution for saving network bandwidth and decreasing the data traﬃc,
assuming we have a large enough set of receivers and the control traﬃc is small relative
to the data traﬃc.
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F3 Better response time.
Interaction between roles aﬀects the response time and that is what the separation
of concern concept asserts. The sender should not directly manage the customers;
doing that will aﬀect the scalability of multicast sessions. S/He may not directly be
responsible for authenticating, authorizing or accounting for them. This will lessen
the interactions between a sender and all receivers. Intermediate routers manage the
join and leave process for each user, so the number of control messages between the
receivers and a sender is minimized. This improves the response time for the receiving
service and improves the network bandwidth as well.
Content providers and owners insist on securing the multicast distribution model
to control the use of their intellectual properties. This kind of protection needs to be
valid for a certain period of time. If we could not develop a protection mechanism
for multicast, then no company will develop intellectual properties.
In the following sections we will explore some of the related works that demon-
strate general requirements for adding data protection and access control functions
to IP multicast in the network layer.
3.2 IETF Multicast Group Security Architecture
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Multicast Security working group (MSEC)
proposed the Multicast Group Security Architecture (MGSA) [VC04] as a reference
framework that provides clear-data concealment to the traditional IP multicast. The
MGSA architecture contains four actors: policy server (PS), group control and key
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server (GCKS), the sender, and the receiver.
The PS is in charge of creating, managing and maintaining security policies within
each group. There is an interface between the PS and the GCKS, which is used to
pass security policies. PS peers can talk to each other in a distributed manner in
order to scale up the MGSA framework. Peer PS servers need to authenticate each
other before securely distributing security policies among each other. The GCKS
is responsible for managing multicast groups and maintaining data encryption keys
(DEK) for each group; the DEK is used to secure individual group-data. Group-data
are the data that need to be securely exchanged within a speciﬁc group. The GCKS
is also responsible for authenticating and authorizing end users and collaborating
with another peer GCKS server in order to scale up and distribute GCKS related
responsibilities. The GCKS contacts the senders and the receivers every once in a
while for the purpose of KEK updates according to a speciﬁc policy issued by PS. Peer
GCKS servers must authenticate each other before securely distributing information
among each other. The sender is the entity who uses a speciﬁc KEK received from
GCKS; s/he encrypts the group-data and then sends it to N receivers. In GCKS
models any user can be the sender. The receiver is the entity that needs to be
authenticated and authorized by the nearest GCKS before receiving the KEK and
related policies [VC04]. See Figure 13.
The MGSA model can be implemented to a local area network (LAN) or a wide
area network (WAN). The MGSA model has a simple structure in LAN; it is also
called the centralized reference framework. It consists of a PS, a GCKS, the sender
of a group, and at least one of the receivers. This structure suﬃces for small groups.
When the group is larger (perhaps spanning more than one administrative region),
the PS and the GCKS may be replicated, as is shown in the right column in Figure 13,
and an individual receiver will connect to its local GCKS. Further details are available
in [VC04].
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Figure 13: Multicast group security architecture [VC04]
This PS/GCKS model provides an example of the separation of concern concept
in addition to the ﬂexibility and simplicity of the IP multicast design model. The
GCKS is the core entity in the MGSA architecture; along with the policy server, it is
the manager of the group and is concerned with maintaining the conﬁdentiality of the
data being sent to all group members. Data conﬁdentiality is achieved by protecting
the data before making it available [VC04]. Many proposals have been presented
for improving the scalability of the manager task [Mit97, WMSL00, MA07, ZZM+06,
CC03, CS05].
There are many advantages to the MGSA architecture:
• It adds a network protection layer to the delivered data ﬂow packets.
• It works with any multicast routing protocol.
• It can be used as a reference framework for securing large multicast groups.
• It provides three functions: multicast security management, multicast group
key management and multicast data ﬂow security.
MGSA introduces the need for eﬃcient key management and distribution as well as
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the requirements for manipulating and carrying out access control of multicast content
media for both the senders and the receivers; however, the speciﬁcation of MGSA
does not mention the requirements for accounting for the content media usage. Since
MGSA’s introduction, scalable key management protocols and schemes have been
proposed by many authors. The IETF Multicast Deployment (MBONED) working
group has introduced the requirements for accounting and controlling access to the
IP multicast [THVV10]; they call this “well-managed” IP multicast. None of these
previous studies provide the requirements for protecting content media from a hostile
person who may receive the clear content media legitimately.
In summary, the most obvious advantage of the MGSA model is that the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) Multicast Security (MSEC) working group added two
new players, the Group Controller / Key Server (GCKS) and the policy server (PS),
to the conventional IP multicast in order to provide conﬁdentiality of transmitted
data in the network layer [VC04].
3.3 Atwood Model for Multicast Distribution
The increasing development of network technologies removes any need to consider the
location or distance of target consumers. If we consider video on demand (VOD) as
a small transaction between a content provider and a customer, the content provider
or owner will take the responsibility of managing and maintaining the detailed cor-
responding records. Multicast content media distribution (ex. scheduled program),
which consists of multiple instances of unicast connections (distribution tree), is a
group of such transactions, and the supervision that exists between CP and EU in
unicast case is no longer there in multicast case, because that will hurt the scalability
of the multicast model.
As the delivery of high quality multimedia content media becomes faster, because
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Figure 14: Multicast security architecture [J. 07]
of the increasing development of networking technologies, the location or distance of
target consumers ceases to be of concern. This increases the potential size of the
target audience for a speciﬁc content media stream. If “video on demand” (VOD) is
required, then each request is likely to occur at a diﬀerent time, and therefore must
be managed separately. The content provider/owner will take the responsibility for
managing a session, and maintaining the detailed corresponding records (session keys,
account information, etc.). As the total number of participants in a session increases,
the load on the content server increases in proportion. Eventually, as noted above, a
point may be reached where the content server is unable to sustain the necessary ﬂows,
and it becomes useful to consider relaxing the “on-demand” requirement, in favor of
the requirement for “eﬃcient delivery”, by using scheduled delivery and multicast
data transmission. However, the supervisory relationship that exists between content
provider and end user in the ﬁrst case is no longer present in the second case, because
to maintain it would hurt the scalability of the multicast model (F1, F2, F3). In this
case, an eﬃcient solution is to give this supervisory responsibility to intermediate
proxies, and oﬀer the content providers a limited summary. This was proposed by
Islam and Atwood [IA06], see Figure 14.
Islam and Atwood [IA06, IA09] realized that the network service providers (NSP)
should contribute to the solution; they state that without the help of the NSP, there
will not be a feasible solution for scalable multicast content media distribution. They
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propose adding distributed authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) func-
tionalities to the IETF model as a way to motivate both NSP and content provider(s)
to deploy this service. Atwood [J. 07] proposed an architecture for secure multicast
content media distribution. He calls his model “Multicast Security Architecture”
(MSA). The solution touches billing and security parts for delivered media. Fig-
ure 14 shows the components of the MSA architecture. Sultana and Atwood, as
well as Islam and Atwood, discuss the end user authentication and authorization
services within MSA framework in order to control the access for group members
[SA05, IA06, IA07b]. Islam and Atwood propose policy enforcement mechanisms at
network level [IA09, IA07a].
MSA [J. 07] has seven main parties: the content provider (CP), the end user (EU),
the network service provider (NSP), the merchant (MR), the ﬁnancial institution (FI),
the content server (CS), and the AAA server (AAAS) [J. 07].
The CS is responsible for producing the digital content media for a selected group
session; the CP receives the encryption key from the group owner and encrypts the
digital content media before the distribution starts. The CS is responsible for de-
livering the encrypted media. The MR is responsible for advertising and managing
content media as well as distributing the electronic ticket for the legal EU according
to a deﬁned policy stated by CP. The FI is responsible for providing a proof that
the selected EU is able to pay. The NSP provides suitable media to use multicast
as a distribution mechanism for content media, account for the use of content media
and enforce the usage policy as deﬁned by the CP. It checks the EU’s credentials and
provides authorization mechanisms for a legal EU via the AAAS, as well as provid-
ing the accounting mechanism on behalf the MR and the CP. The EU is the entity
that consumes the content media and provides funds for that consumption. It gets
an electronic ticket from the MR in order to show it to the NSP who is responsible
for attaching the EU to a multicast session. The NSP connects the CS and the EU




Even though IP-Multicast distribution is not secure, it lowers the resources usage
at the sender’s site, and at the closest NSP resources near to the sender. The IETF
multicast group security architecture provides scalable protection at the network level
for the delivered content media, in other words, it provides scalable protection before
delivery. It also provides simple policy management for each multicast group. The
IETF multicast group security architecture does not provide any protection after the
delivery of the content media. Atwood’s multicast security architecture (MSA) has
broader control and management for the delivered content media. The MSA model
includes receiver and sender access control, and policy management. In this chapter,
we brieﬂy detailed the multicast security architecture, which is based on multicast
distribution, and what protections it provides. The main problem with the multicast
security model is that it does not prevent a dishonest customer from forwarding
any delivered data. What we miss at this stage is to identify a comprehensive set
of requirements to enforce DRM functionalities into multicast content distribution
model. In this thesis, we will investigate general DRM requirements and show how
to push them into multicast distribution model.
We are interested in reaching a solution that provides persistent protection and
scalable content media distribution model in such a way that the attacker cannot
defeat the system for long period of time. In this thesis, we will suggest some ways
to enhance the generic DRM model by integrating some of the scalability properties





In this chapter, we will show a solid understanding of problem statement which the
dissertation addresses, which is: design a ﬂexible mechanism, architecture and proto-
cols, for scalable, scheduled and persistently protected content media delivery.
The DRM model is mainly designed to provide persistent control of the delivered
content media. The technologies used with most existing DRM systems depend on
long-period protection software or hardware. Hardware-based protection solutions
are feasible where the protection providers have control over the hardware; therefore,
OMA adopts a hardware solution, because cell phone providers have control over
the hardware-based protection embedded in the cellphones. These models are not
open platform models. There are a lot of pieces inside their community that are
private. It is not impossible to reverse engineer these pieces, but like everything
else, persistent protection is only valid for a certain time, and that time depends on
how hard it is to reverse engineer the protection mechanism. The hardware-based
protection solutions are valid for a longer time, but not forever. As a content provider,
to increase persistent protection on delivered content media, it is required that s/he
has some control over the hardware-based protection, and the cellular community has
that control on the hardware-based protection embedded in cellular set. That is out
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of scope for our problem at hand, because we want to look at a more general market,
which includes personal computers and laptops. This implies that the protection
needs to be quickly deployed and easily to be replaced. Software-based protection
provides these attributes.
Various approaches exist for doing DRM based on the unicast distribution mech-
anism, and that creates a concern that unicast-based DRM system is not scalable
when the number of users, who are using this service, increases. This increases the
resources used at the sender’s site, and at the closest NSP’s resources near to the
sender [PA11]. Scalable content delivery in this thesis context means that the re-
sulting solution can aﬀord any increasing number of end users. A promising and cost
eﬀective way to improve the scalability of the current DRM systems is to change their
underlying distribution mechanism from unicast into multicast.
Many delivery applications need to support scheduled delivery because some ap-
plications, such as online world cup, interest million of users around the world, and
the content media owner will be interested if the content media is persistently pro-
tected. Persistent protection in this thesis context covers content media protection
after delivery.
At the beginning of our work, we did not have a comprehensive list of requirements
for unicast DRM or multicast DRM. We start our work by:
Goal1: Exploring and collecting basic list of requirements for both unicast DRM
and multicast DRM.
Later on as the work progressed and we become more mature in the area of DRM
world, we found the collected list of DRM requirements is applicable to both unicast
and multicast DRM. As the work progressed, this realization became clear that only
the implementation and architecture are diﬀerent.
Once the list is established, we will explore what parts of the requirements are not
met or cannot be met with existing architecture when multicast is used. We found
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that a small part of DRM requirements is met with IETF MGSA architecture, and
a larger part of DRM requirements is met with MSA architecture. We will identify
missing parts of DRM requirements that MSA architecture misses.
After determining the requirements that are lost, we will continue our work:
Goal2: Develop and validate methods that exhibit superior persistence and more
scalable approach compared with previous approaches.
To achieve goal2, we will explore and validate the proposal of Grimen et al., which
provides a light on persistent protection, using a formal tool to ensure that it works
correctly for the unicast case. In other words, we will use Grimen et al.’s ideas
to harden and increase the security of the protection applications that are used to
control the content media access after it has been delivered. Then, we will propose
and validate an extension to this approach for the multicast case and suggest an
appropriate architecture for implementing the new approach. Thus, we improve the
performance and scalability of current DRM systems by changing the underlying






In this chapter, we are introducing the basic DRM requirements as a starting point
for the solution to proposed problems with current unicast and multicast distribution
systems. The main problem with the multicast security model is that it does not
prevent a dishonest customer from forwarding any delivered data, and that problem
is not perfectly solved in the current software-based DRM systems. Also, as we
noticed, a typical unicast-based DRM system is not scalable when the number of
customers exceeds the capacity of the NSP and/or the CP.
This chapter presents the fulﬁllment of our ﬁrst goal, to explore and collect a basic
list of requirements for both unicast DRM and multicast DRM.
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5.1 Basic DRM Requirements
Nowadays, the digital world makes the copying of digital content media easy and
perfect, which makes protecting these media more diﬃcult. Digital rights man-
agement is a scheme designed to protect digital assets. There are four basic pro-
cesses used in the DRM system: protection, distribution, management and control
[Ian01, Ltd02]. Many researchers proposed a list of requirements in order to give
the content providers the ability to acquire control for their digital intellectual prop-
erty, and preserve the producers and consumers rights [NN07, JM07, AH05, LSNS03,
AH07, LELD05, OLR+07]. We organize these requirements into ﬁve categories: ac-
cess control, security, privacy, robustness and marketing:
R1: Prevent illegal access and allow legal access to valuable media.
R1.A: Prevent the action of capturing clear content media in the distri-
bution path.
R1.B: Prevent the action of stealing clear content media when it is hosted
at the end user’s machine.




R3: Regulate the legal operation of content media; in other words, permit diﬀerent
authorization activities for diﬀerent types of transactions.
R3.A: Content owners need to specify their content media usage policies.
R3.B: Content media usage speciﬁcations need to be protected and dis-
tributed to their appropriate destination.
R3.C: Speciﬁed usage activities need to be enforced.
R4: Ensure the integrity of digital assets.
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Table 3: DRM Requirements












R5: Ensure the non-repudiation for the service.
R6: Ensure the privacy of end users.
R7: Ensure the availability of the service.
R8: Reduce the damage caused by the attacker.
R8.A: Prevent “break-once, break everywhere” (BOBE).
R8.B: Detect and fence the cause of illegal content media distribution.
R8.C: Repair the protection engine once it has been compromised.
R9: Support service on demand.
R10: Ensure eﬃcient use of content provider’s resources.
R11: Allow domain access.
In Table 3, we map these requirements into the ﬁve categories: access control
(AC), security, privacy, robustness and marketing. In the next section, we will give a
justiﬁcation of the elements in this table and discuss the goals behind these require-
ments in detail.
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5.1.1 Goals behind Basic DRM Requirements
The content owners do their best and spend time and eﬀort to produce remarkable
intellectual properties. They need to protect their works in order to control the
use of them for a certain period of time. DRM strives to achieve “persistent access
control” for the content provider/owner and provides him/her the ability to regulate
the content media operations [JM07, AH07]. This persistency is achieved by hiding
the content media as a ﬁrst stage, then ﬁltering the access to it as a second stage.
Requirement one is about hiding the content media and both requirements two and
three are about ﬁltering and organizing the content media access. Hiding the content
media is accomplished by making the following sub-requirements valid:
R1.A: Prevent the action of capturing clear content media in the distri-
bution path [Access control requirement].
R1.B: Prevent the action of stealing clear content media when it is hosted
at end users’ machine [Access control requirement].
To allow only legitimate customers to utilize the service, a demand for identify-
ing and authenticating the customers is needed. Requirement two is to ensure the




This involves clarifying, ensuring and assessing the truth of any declaration sourced
by a valid entity (content sender, content consumer and the digital assets), we con-
sider it as security requirement. To start with, consumers want to ensure the identity
and authenticity of the sender(s) before receiving any data, and this is useful for
protecting customers from sender spooﬁng. As well, a sender requires that each valid
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customer be identiﬁed and authenticated before s/he is authorized to use the product,
and this will help for billing issues. Finally, the content consumer hopes to authen-
ticate the product itself before s/he starts using it. This process helps him/her to
avoid any harm that could be sourced from unknown content providers or products.
Requirement three introduces the need for managing diﬀerent types of content
media usage, that is why we classify this requirement as both access control and
marketing. It is further subdivided into the following sub-goals:
R3.A Content owners need to specify their content media usage policies
(rights/licenses) [Marketing requirement] [JM07, Irw04].
R3.B Content media usage speciﬁcations need to be protected and dis-
tributed to their appropriate destination [Access control require-
ment] [JM07].
R3.C Speciﬁed usage activities need to be enforced [Access control re-
quirement] [NN07, Kam02].
Requirement four ensures that any digital assets used in the context of content
media distribution have not been changed in the path from content providers to
content consumer, and it takes two ﬂavors: checking the digital assets’ integrity in
the distribution path and giving a promise to the Stakeholders that the digital asset
will not be changed at the point when the end user can access it; we considered it a
security requirement, because if the integrity of the assets is violated, then it could
introduce a hole in the content media distribution model.
Requirement ﬁve is to ensure the non-repudiation action for the requesting process,
which is an important security service that avoids any tensions that could happen
between content seller chain and the end users. There should be evidence of sell-
ing/buying the product for both sellers and buyers. The seller needs this service to
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prevent the buyer from denying using the service and not paying the fees. At the
same time, if user protection is broken because of a delibrate security hole embeded
inside a product sold by the seller, then this oﬀensive action should not be denied by
the seller, this is a kind of security requirement. To conclude, both the sellers and
the buyers should be responsible for their activities. In another view, if the access to
the service is granted, then this action should not be repudiated. We consider this
requirement as both security and marketing requirement.
The sixth requirement aﬃrms anonymity to end users by preventing unauthorized
entities from accessing users’ private information such as name, address, date of birth,
credit card number, and so on. This information could help the attacker to gain access
to transactions that belong to someone else. It is a privacy requirement.
Requirement seven is important for all parties. It concerns keeping the product
service, the users can receive the digital product and its license if they are eligible
without any blocking, which means that denial of service (DOS) attacks must neces-
sarly be eliminated. We considered it as a robustness requirement.
Requirement eight tries to reduce or mitigate the unsatisfactory eﬀects of service
attacks. It tries to ﬁnd a means of defense against intentional irresponsible actions
and return the system to the previous stable state. It is a robustness requirement.
We further subdivide it into three lines of defense.
R8.A Prevent “break-once, break everywhere” (BOBE) [PBW02, JM07].
R8.B Detect and fence the cause of illegal content media distribution.
R8.C Revise the protection engine once it has been compromised [JM07,
BE06, GMM06b].
Requirement nine endows the DRM system with ﬂexibility; once the users choose
the time frame for enabling legal operations on the content media, they should be able
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to do that [JM07]. Somehow, it is related to the availability requirement, R7. This
requirement is important for marketing issues, because if the service is motivating
users, then the service provider is successfully marketing her/his product.
Requirement ten seeks the eﬃcient usage of the content providers’ resources. It
contradicts requirement nine, which demands reserving ﬁxed resources for each indi-
vidual user. Because of the fact that senders have limited resources, they can serve
only a limited number of users. Therefore the ﬂexibility desired by requirement nine
is inﬂuenced by the eﬃciency desired by requirement ten. Requirement 10 is again a
marketing requirement.
Requirement eleven gives the ability to each customer to use the same content
media on a limited number of devices s/he owns. It is preferable that deploying
any technique to achieve this requirement not hurt any of the previous requirements.
This requirement attracts a customer to use this service, therefore it is a marketing
requirement.
5.2 Addressing Basic DRM Requirements within
DRM Examples
Section 2.3.2 shows current DRM solutions and discusses four examples of DRM mod-
els and their limitations. In this section, we will address the basic DRM requirements
of the DRM model examples.
Figure 15 addresses the availability of the basic DRM requirements in each men-
tioned DRM technology in Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 15: DRM system comparison
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5.3 Persistent Protection Requirements
One of goals that has been requested by content providers is to close the security hole
that exists in the current content media distribution systems, and to motivate the
network service provider to participate in the solution of content media distribution
model. The road to having a scalable content media distribution is dependent on
having the help of the network service provider [J. 07]. In our opinion, adding per-
sistent protection properties to content media distribution systems is done by closing
the security holes generated by dishonest customers.
Persistent protection is English terminology is composed of two words, the word
protection and the word persistent. Technically, protection means, to protect an ob-
ject whether it is tangible or intangible, and persistent in this context means, to make
the protection valid for a certain length of time. In the context of persistent protec-
tion for delivered digital media, and since we are using the Internet to distribute
the content media to a large number of users, the most feasible way to achieve this
protection is to use cryptographic technologies. Encrypting the content media using
eﬃcient and secure encryption algorithm with secure encryption key converts read-
able, watchable and/or audible content media into unreadable, unwatchable and/or
inaudible media, which is called protected content media. This process achieves the
protection phase for the content media.
The next phase is to control the access to the protected content media by authen-
ticating and authorizing the end user(s) who are eligible to read, watch and/or listen
to the content media. By authorizing the end user we mean, that the end user is
allowed to use the content media according to the rights and privileges the end user
has been granted from the content owner or his representative. In order to give the
end user the right to use the content media without removing the protection on the
content media, we need to use a trusted tamper resistant object, which is responsible
for allowing end user to legally use the content media and emphasize permission rights
63
on the content media.
To achieve persistent protection, the tamper resistant object needs to be protected
for the period of time that is enough for the content provider to gain enough control for
his/her work. In our opinion, the road to the protection persistency can be achieved
by making at least the following three basic requirements valid [BA]:
R1 Prevent illegal access and allow legal access to valuable media.
R3 Regulate the legal operation of content media; in other words, permit
diﬀerent authorization activities for diﬀerent types of transactions.
R8 Reduce the damage caused by the attacker.
The ﬁrst one is to hide the digital assets so no one can access them; employing
the cryptographic tchnologies is the easiest way to accomplish this hiding in public
networks. The second one is to arrange and manage the access to the digital assets
by providing legitimate end users with the capabilities to access the protected dig-
ital assets; legitimate clients can use the content media they are provided with the
decryption key, but that should be under careful manipulation in such a way that
they do not really understand the right decryption ﬂow. The third one is to pro-
vide the means for a reaction when detecting an attacker has been successful. This
requirement is more detailed via the following sub-requirements [BA]:
R8.A Prevent break-once, break everywhere (BOBE).
R8.B Detect the cause of illegal content media distribution.
R8.C React to the action of illegal distribution.
Nothing will remain secret forever, so protecting these protection mechanisms is
not something easy, at some time these protection mechanisms will be known and
the hidden content is not really hidden, “DRM systems can’t protect themselves”
[Doc05]. If time is not considered, a knowledgable hacker may have suﬃcient funds
and appropriate tools to extract the sensitive information (key) from the machine’s
memory to achieve a successful attack. The ability to achieve persistent protection
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at the user level depends on the ability to protect the DRM subsystem at the user
side.
In order to reduce the damage caused by the attacker, replacing the protection
mechanism used to control the access to the content media with a new one is one
promising kind of reaction. In this case the attacker spends time and eﬀort in order
to attack and reveal the protection mechanism, which will be not valid at the time of
the eventual attack.
Arbitrary long persistence is not achievable. If the achievable persistence with a
particular mechanism lasts for an insuﬃcient time, then renewability can be used in
order to extend the persistency of the protection. “Renewability” is a term used to
indicate that one of the DRM component(s) can be refreshed or replaced. The basic
mechanism is good enough to last for a speciﬁc time, and a sequence of basic mecha-
nisms provides persistent protection with a suﬃciently long eﬀectiveness. One entity
will interact with the user to renew the protection mechanism periodically or when the
current protection mechanism is compromised or has expired [GMM06a, GMM06b].
This mechanism has the disadvantage that it reduces the network performance due
to the high network bandwidth that is used for this renewability mechanism with the
current DRM system. The renewability mechanism appears not to be used, which
gives us an indication that there is no real persistent protection in current DRM
systems.
Another way to gain long persistence is to use tamper resistant hardware that is
strong enough for the spectrum of expected attacks over the required time, and then
replace these hardware devices, after the period where we think they are not useful
any more or they have expired [SCA]. A hardware solution is suitable for a high-
availability system with few participants. A software solution is suitable and cost
eﬀective when we have very many customers. In order to gain a range of persistence,
either we need a single technique that is strong enough for a desired time period,
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or we need a technique or techniques that are useful only for a shorter time period,
coupled with renewability.
We may need renewability as one element of a DRM toolkit that oﬀers the choice
to use hardware that cannot be broken for long period of time, or to use a combination
of hardware and software that makes the attacker no longer interested in attacking
this distribution model.
5.4 Multicast Consequences
Multicast, as a distrbution mechanism, is an environment used to deliver a copy of
digital data to selected receivers. The most obvious issues when using multicast as a
distribution mechanism are:
• Scale up multicast service to the maximum.
• Remove the exclusive connections between the sender(s) and the receivers.
• Distribute the management of delivering the data stream.
• Reduce the resources that need to be used in multicast service to the minimum.
• Increase the availability of the resources that are used in the multicast service.
We saw in the previous chapter that IP multicast delivers one copy of the data
stream packet to multiple recipients by copying and forwarding the received packet
during the routing process. Multicast participants connect to the multicast group
via the nearest multicast-enabled router using IGMP/MLD protocol. The network
routers collaborate with each other to build the distribution tree. There is no direct
connection between the sender(s) and the receivers in the IP multicast; the sender(s)
is not aware of who the receivers are. The data stream’s delivery is managed by the
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routers that connect the sender(s) to the receivers. When the sender(s) sends one
copy of the data stream, it reduces the resources consumed by the sender(s) to the
minimum. In addition, when the routers copy and forward the data stream, it reduces
the number of packets sent to the minimum. All previous achievements contribute to
increasing the number of packets that can be sent by the sender(s), and thus, increase
the availability of the resources used by the multicast service.
5.5 Multicast Content Media Distribution with DRM
Enabled Requirements
Current DRM requirements are feasible for DRM systems up to the point where the
server capacity cannot satisfy users’ demands. By the time we reach the situation
where the size of their demands goes beyond the server’s capacity, we propably have
enough customers to drop the “service on demand” requirement and replace it with
an oﬀering of scheduled services. This enables the content owner to upgrade the
DRM performance, and therefore, serve more customers. However, it impacts the
solutions to the DRM requirements, because multicast as a distribution mechanism
truncates some DRM requirements and improves some others as well as produces new
challenges in order to mitigate the others. We summarize the following requirements
that need to be adjusted in order to enable DRM in the multicast model (DRMM),
then we will discuss these requirements in detail.
R1 Prevent illegal access and allow legal access to valuable media
This requirement is to attain “remote control” along with the “Persistent Access
Control” [AH07] on multicast content media distribution, we need the following sub-
requirements to be valid:
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R1.A Prevent the action of capturing the content media in the network
level.
This requirement is being achieved by hiding the content media using cryptogra-
phy techniques and key management protocols, and then allowing the legal customers
to use the content media by giving them the means to unhide the hidden content me-
dia.
R1.B Prevent the action of illegal copying of the clear content media from
customers’ machine.
We need to build and deploy a tamper resistent object that controls the use of
content media and prevents end users from attaining sensitive data. To achieve this
requirement, we further divide it into the following sub-requirements:
R1.B.I The need for building DRM mediator by which only it has the
capability to render protected content media for a distinct user.
R1.B.II DRM mediator needs to be trusted.
Trust in this context means that the mediator is not subject to change by any
illegal entities.
R2 Ensure the authenticity of digital assets, senders and receivers
[AH07].
Authenticating the sender as well as the customers or their devices is a prereq-
uisite requirement for authorizing them. Autentication of the object is required for
subsequent use with non-repudiation requirement.
R3 Regulate the legal operation of content media.
To achieve this requirement, we will use the idea of distributing a license to autho-
rize the use of a content media. We further divide this requirement into the following
sub-requirements:
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R3.A Only legitimate users can gain access to the valid licenses.
R3.B It is recommended that license issuers can account for customers’
usages without hurting the scalability of the multicast model.
R4 Ensure the integrity of digital assets [AH07].
Since the sender of the digital assets is not connected to the end user, then, this
requirement becomes more urgent than in the unicast case. The reason behind that
in the multicast case is the receiver needs to assure that the content media comes
from a certain source, not from an attacker, and that helps him to assure for to a
certain limit that the recived product will not aﬀect the end user integrity.
R5 Ensure the non-repudiation for the service [AH07, OLR+07].
This service is urgent in the multicast case because the sender cannot track the
service usage by the end user, and thus cannot directly have a proof for the content
media consumption. This requirement is divided into the following sub-requirements:
R5.A Each end user needs to be uniquely identiﬁed.
This unique identiﬁcation can be used to bind the tamper resistant object to the
end user’s machine, and thus the next requirement is needed,
R5.B Tamper resistant object should not be predictable or duplicated.
This requirements is needed to prevent the end user from cloning tamper resistant
object and forwarding it to his friends;
R6 Protect the privacy of end users.
R7 Ensure the availability of the service [AH07].
Obviously, this requirement is urgent in the multicast case because if the service
is not available for a short time, it will discount many users. This requirement is
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achieved by the satisfying the following sub-requirements:
R7.A Protect the end user environment from hardware and software at-
tacker.
R7.b Protect the network resources from network attackers.
R7.A Protect the sender’s resources from hardware and software attacker.
If requirement R7.A is not achieved for some users, then the service is stopped for
those users, which we do not want. However, if requirements R7.B and R7.C are not
achieved, then the service is stopped for many if not all users.
R8 Reduce the eﬀect of service compromise.
As we said before, requirement eight comprises three levels of defence, which are
summarized in the following sub-requirements:
R8.A Prevent “break-once, break everywhere”.
R8.B Detect and limit the eﬀect of that illegal content media distribution.
R8.B is further subdivided into:
R8.B.I End users’ Content needs to be distinguished and individualized.
R8.B.II This distinction needs to be robust.
R8.C Revise the protection engine once it is being compromized [JM07,
BE06, GMM06b].
R9 Support service on demand.
For requirement nine, multicast does not support this requirement any more.
R10 Ensure eﬃcient use of content provider’s resources.
For requirement ten, multicast as a technology improves this requirement.
R11 Allow domain access.
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This requirement needs to be considered after satisfying the previous requirements
(R1...R8).
The next step is a comprehensive study of these requirements.
5.6 DRM for Multicast Requirements Comprehen-
sive Study
From the scalability and content owners point view, multicast distribution gives up
the opportunity to improve the performance for some requirements that are met
in DRM unicast case, e.g., eﬃciency requirement (R10). But, it kills some other
requirements, e.g., VOD requirement (R9). In diﬀerent viewpoint, it cannot easily
satisfy the BOBE requirement (R8.A), which is solved by individualization in the
unicast solution. In the previous section we mapped the requirements for multicast
and those requirements that need to be achieved in order to reach the optimal case for
multicast DRM enabled solution. We will discuss each requirement from the multicast
point of view.
R1.B Prevent the action of illegal copying of the clear content media from
customers’ machines.
This requirement is to assure full remote control and “Persistent Access Control”
[AH07] on the digital assets for a limited period of time and is considered the most
vital requirement for securing current multicast technologies. Without it, the content
owner will not be cheering, if he doubts that his extensive work to produce remarkable
product is under control once it comes to the customers’ hands. To attain remote
control on multicast assets, they must be protected at the network and the application
levels.
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The most mature scheme to protect multicast content media is Secure Multicast
[J. 07], but it protects the content media at the network level. A sender encrypts
the clear content media before ﬂowing it into the distribution tree and individually
sending these keys to each end user. Because some multicast applications require a
dynamic membership, keys may need to be refreshed for every membership change.
R1.A is well established by many researchers working in multicast key management
and distribution, and we will not discuss it further.
A legal customer should behave in the way that they should: not copy or redis-
tribute granted content media; unfortunately, bad users do not behave in the way
that they should. To keep clear content media away from the users’ hands and give
the rights to legal customers to use them are the means for controlling the use of con-
tent media. Enforcing these rights would be the responsibility of the network service
providers (NSP) and clients’ platform. Satisfying both R1.B.I and R1.B.II gives the
system the chance to achieve remote control at the application level.
R1.B.I suggests that to remove users’ ability to directly access clear content media,
it is suﬃcient to build a DRM mediator to mandate an individual user and give him
the capability to legally use the content media with considering only legal usages to
the service. In this way, the mediator holds up the customer’s ability for extracting
keys or any sensitive information used to protect the content media, e.g., knowing
which algorithm is used for content media protection, and thus the end user can
obtain the clear content media with great diﬃculty only.
OMA DRM 2 speciﬁcation achieves the content media protection by keeping the
private key inside tamper-resistant hardware, and by hiding the technology secrets
used to build the DRM agent. Because the major audience for our proposed multi-
cast content media is generic PCs, applying tamper-resistant hardware for multicast
content media distribution is not feasible because the cost is unaﬀordable. The major
problem with those PCs is that they do not have any special hardware that provides
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tamper resistance and their operating systems are generic and do not provide any
real protection [HB05b].
The feasibility could be achieved when applying tamper-resistant software. R1.B.I
proposes to build a DRM mediator to control legal activities. However, a problem
arises when a legal customer redirects that mediator to illegal customers, or extracts
the secrets embedded inside the DRM mediator, or tries to modify the logic of the
DRM mediator, e.g., modify the part of the code that is responsible for enforcement
activities. R1.B.II requires a means to establish a trusted mediator in order to resist
the following attacks:
1. Forward the working version of DRM mediator.
2. Reverse engineer the mediator.
3. Modify the logic of the mediator.
Requirement R3 helps the content owner to control and manage the access to the
content media; it is to manage the relationship among all parties in the system. We
can call it a marketing requirement. In this requirement’s view point, the content
seller needs to be able to specify the terms and conditions for using the content media.
The policy server can specify what accounting information needs to be recorded for
an accepted End User. This makes it possible, for example, to collect accounting
information.
R3 is subdivided into two sub-requirements:
R3.A suggests to use licenses to authorize a legitimate customer to consume the
content media. The license should describe the legal rights, constraints and include
the encryption key. The license should resist being modiﬁed or forwarded to unau-
thorized users [Coy03]. Knowing that licenses are susceptible to an analyzing attack,
which may allow the attacker to discover and extract encryption keys hidden in the
73
license, we need a mechanism that prevents the customer from tampering with these
licenses.
R3.B takes care of another issue, if we adopt the LP role to manage the distribu-
tion of the license, we need to deploy it in a way such that the license sender does
not need to be aware of the existence of the end user (F1) see Chapter 3, which
contradicts the accounting issue. We need a cost eﬀective mechanism to use licenses
as an authorization and accounting mechanism.
R4 is to verify the integrity of the digital assets, security services and the cus-
tomers’ device. Digital assets comprises the content media, policy, licence and DRM
mediator.
R5 ensures the non-repudiation of requesting a service. A content owner needs
its customers to commit to non-repudiation of the request for a service. In the same
sense, customers need content owners to commit to non-repudiation of the sending
service or any damages could harm customers by using any DRM mediator. This
requires that content owners or distributors should not alter the customer’s security
services.
R6 Protect the privacy of end users. We believe that this requirement has not
fully been achieved in the existing DRM models. The content owner needs to trust
customers before authorizing them (giving them the license) to use his/her products.
In the DRM system, the trust model is based on direct security association between
CP, LP and end user. Therefore, there is one advisor who mandates customers to
follow her/his protocol. It is the responsibility of the end user to know who he is
dealing with. Multicast deals with more complicated requirements due to the simul-
taneous multiple users’ connection and dynamic membership support. Users may not
be aware of the real senders’ authority and then they should not be responsible for
checking the senders’ honesty. Entrusted role could break the whole system. There-
fore, trust model has to be changed in a way that follows collaborative protocols
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between roles and does not reduce the system scalability.
End users need to show their private information to LP as an evidence of their
ability to pay for a speciﬁc service. Users need be sure that their private information
will not be used in a wrong way; this problem is not solved in most DRM systems.
Worse than that, users’ privacy is under attack, but there is no legal recourse against
the attackers [FH06, HB05b]. The largest challenge here is that using the DRM
mediator makes saving user’s privacy harder, because it may hide a rootkit [FH06,
HB05a].
R7 Ensure the availability of the service. Here we are talking about preventing
DOS attack and maintaining the consistency of CP, LP, digital assets, policies, and
licenses. In the DRM system, the services become more available by introducing more
servers or caches near to users, as well as by using peer-to-peer distribution, and this
will increase the network load, especially when the number of users is inﬂating. The
nature of multicast distibution reduces the extensive interactions between the senders’
servers and receivers’ machines (F3) see Chapter 3, which improves the scalability and
reduces the number of servers needed to provide such a facility. Multicast introduces
two challenges on this issue: a) the need for maintaining and accounting for end
users’ behavior requires the interaction between servers and clients; b) the increasing
number of users will increase the probability of DOS attack. This issue was discussed
by Islam and Atwood [IA06].
R8 introduces three lines of defense to mitigate the fact of compromising the
service. R8.A is the second line of defense. If the attacker unveils the secrets used to
hide digital assets, s/he can aﬀect all the roles (content owners, content distributors
and end users), s/he can play the sender role or harm end users and send viruses
as well as redistribute content media and throw away content owners’ money. This
tragedy was limited in DRM solution because of the individualization technique.
We need to deploy this technique for each individual DRM mediator and license on
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condition that this individualization should not hurt the scalability requirement.
R8.B is the third line of defense. Content owners spent a long time generating
content media and if anybody can download them from the Internet for free, then
no artist can make any beneﬁt. Monitoring the Darknet [PBW02] for illegal content
media distribution and tracing the source of that distribution is the third line of
defense and a way to prevent such bad actions. In DRM systems, this could be done
by ﬁngerprinting each individual copy. Multicast makes it harder to insert a diﬀerent
mark for each copy, because all customers should receive the same copy. This is one
of the big challenging issues.
R8.C is the fourth line of defense, which requires that the system roll back to
the previous secure state once it has been compromised. Multicast as a distribution
mechanism may provide a promising solution to achieve this requirement.
The previous requirements are needed in the new system, some of them are easy,
and others are not.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have built the structure that illuminates the starting point to
get to the fundamental solution for scalable and persistent protection for the deliv-
ered content media. We presented eleven basic requirements to achieve basic DRM
functionalities. These requirements are organized into ﬁve categories: access con-
trol, security, privacy, robustness and marketing. Some of the eleven requirements
are contradicting others, which leads to ﬁnding a trade-oﬀ when building a DRM
system. We found that there are three basic requirements out of eleven that repre-
sent the basic rule to achieve persistent protection. These three have a total of eight
sub-requirements, of which renewability and individualization are the most important
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pieces. We have in mind to use multicast distribution mechanism to achieve scalabil-
ity for delivered content media. In the next chapter, we will be looking for proposals





Grimen et al. [GMM06b] proposed a software solution based on periodic renewal
of the protection scheme that is used to control the access to content media. The
software-based solution they proposed appeared to be a promising solution, but we
have found two attacks against the protocol that they use to control the access to
protected media. We will discuss their solution in Section 6.1, then we will go through
the Grimen distribution protocol and introduce a formal version of the protocol in
Section 6.2, after that we will show attacks on Grimen model and give a formal
model of the attack in Section 6.4. In Section 6.5, we give a solution to the attack,
and demonstrate its security.
This chapter presents an approach to DRM that exhibits superior persistence,
which is a necessary prerequisite to meeting our second goal.
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Figure 16: Dividing the media content media [GMM06b]
6.1 Grimen Distribution Architecture
Grimen et al. [GMM06b] proposed an architecture for software-based secure content
media distribution that consists of four players: the content provider (CP), the stream
server, which we are going to call the content server (CS), the viewer software (VS)
and the security server (SS). The CP encodes the content media, and divides it into
many pieces. It then produces as many symmetric keys as there are media pieces, in
order to protect each piece with one unique symmetric key. This process results in
what they called an encrypted encoded media document (EEMD) and makes it ready
for distribution. See Figure 16. The authors called the time period for each piece a
trust interval.
The CS is in charge of distributing the EEMD piece by piece. The VS player is
running within the user environment. It is responsible for decrypting and decoding
the EEMD and then rendering the content media and making it available for viewing.
The SS is responsible for generating and delivering a piece of code called a Mobile
Guard (MG), which is able to execute in the user environment. The MG needs to be
plugged into the VS. The MG needs to be sent to the VS in order to conﬁgure the
VS to maintain security states of the media document. The MG is responsible for
checking the integrity of the VS components, including the MG itself, see Section 6.2,
and then after successful integrity checking, the SS is going to deliver a corresponding
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media key for a current delivered piece of the EEMD. The authors claim that the
MG is hard to compromise; if successful software modiﬁcations happens, it will be
detected and the system will have break once break everywhere resistance [GMM06b],
see Section 6.2.
As the encoded media document is being split into multiple pieces, each piece is
encrypted with a diﬀerent key. The SS is going to provide the decryption key for each
piece only at the start of its particular trust interval, upon request and after checking
the integrity of VS; the VS needs to prove its good intention before delivery of the new
decryption key. This good intention is achieved when the VS receives and executes a
new generated MG, which means that for every decryption key there is a new MG.
Each MG is distinct from the others, and each one is responsible for reconﬁguring
and securing the VS. The MG needs to be obfuscated to prevent the software hacker
from predicting the internal logic of the MG within short period of time [GMM06b].
The MG is replaced for each trust interval, in order to prevent the software attacker
from predicting the VS conﬁguration when he has the time to gain the knowledge.
Each instance of the MG is responsible for protecting the access control mechanism
used by the VS for the duration of the trust interval. Each MG instance is going to
check the integrity of the VS every new trust interval. The VS is going to request the
corresponding decryption key at the end of each trust interval. The SS is responsible
for receiving the checksum for the VS for each trust interval. Then, upon verifying
the correctness of each checksum, it is going to send the next decryption key that
corresponds to the new media piece. Figure 17 shows the Grimen et al. proposed
architecture.
6.2 Grimen Distribution Protocol
The details of the process of receiving the decryption key for each trust interval (as
proposed by Grimen et al. [GMM06b]) are as follows:
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Figure 17: Grimen et al. proposed system architecture [GMM06b]
• The VS generates a random unpredictable transport key.
• The MG executes and determines the integrity checksum of the VS along with
the MG itself.
• The integrity checksum is determined by computing a one-way hash function
across the VS code, the MG code, MG’s public key and the generated transport
key. See Figure 18.
• The VS encrypts the transport key with the SS public key.
• The VS sends the encrypted transport key to the SS along with the integrity
checksum.
• The SS veriﬁes the checksum. Since the SS can extract the transport key, and
since it knows the VS instructions, the MG instructions, MG’s public key and
the generated transport key, the SS can then generate the checksum. The SS
veriﬁes the calculated checksum against the received checksum. If the veriﬁca-
tion is successful, the SS encrypts the corresponding trust interval’s media key
with the transport key and sends it to the VS.
• The VS now can decrypt the corresponding piece of the EEMD. See Figure 19.
In the next section, we will introduce a protocol model checker called AVISPA.
Then, we will validate the key exchange protocol using the AVISPA tool.
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Figure 18: Grimen et al. hash function calculation [GMM06b]
Figure 19: Grimen et al. key exchange protocol [GMM06b]
6.3 Automated Validation of Internet Security Pro-
tocols and Applications
The Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications (AVISPA)
is a model checker veriﬁcation tool and is also considered a descriptive language that
is useful for validating cryptographic protocols. A group of researchers has evaluated
85% of the IETF protocols using the AVISPA tools; this indicates that AVISPA
is powerful. The AVISPA architecture is composed of four veriﬁcation utilities or
back-ends [Tea06a, HS06], see Figure 20. Each back-end uses diﬀerent veriﬁcation
techniques:
• OFMC stands for On-the-Fly Model-Checker.
• Cl-AtSe stands for CL-based Attack Searcher.
• SATMC stands for SAT-based Model Checker.
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Figure 20: HLPSL architecture [Tea06a]
• TA4SP stands for Tree Automata based Protocol Analyzer.
In real life, interacting users that use the public network need to authenticate each
other before securely exchanging data. Using a public network, this authentication is
achieved by using a cryptographic protocol. It is important to verify cryptographic
protocols to validate their security properties.
In AVISPA, security protocols are modeled with the high-level protocol speciﬁca-
tion language (HLPSL), which is considered a Meta Language that can be translated
into intermediate format (IF). The IF can be used by the four utilities, which are able
to understand it.
HLPSL is a role-based formal language; the state of the interacting roles in HLPSL
is constructed using the idea of ﬁnite state machine (FSM); thus this language is
considered an expressive language. In AVISPA model, we can represent interact-
ing entities as roles, each has a state and possible transition(s). The transition is
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represented by exchanged messages between participants. HLPSL language has the
capability to model security messages and also to show if the security properties are
maintained. AVISPA helps to catch vulnerabilities in the security protocols. There
are hierarchical roles in HLPSL [Tea06b]:
• Basic roles: they represent interacting parties.
• Session role: it contains composition roles, which sketch how basic roles com-
municate with each other.
• Environment role: it works as a main coordinator, which declares constant
variables, intruder knowledge and sessions call.
Goal section is one component of the HLPSL program. In that section, you can assert
one of three security checks:
• Message secrecy: e.g., secret(T,id,A,B), which asserts that the value of token
T, that has protocol id labeled “id” used to identify the goal, is only shared
between role A and role B.
• Weak authenticity: e.g., the end user sends a token and claims that he is a
speciﬁc identiﬁer; the receiver needs to look for the validity of the token not for
the validity of the sender’s identity.
• Strong authenticity: the end user sends a token and claims that he is a speciﬁc
identiﬁer; the receiver needs to look for the validity of both the token as well as
the sender’s identity.
As seen in Figure 20, AVISPA has a tool called hlpsl2if, which converts the HLPSL
speciﬁcation model into intermediate format (IF). Afterward, the user has the option
to use any of the back-ends supported by AVISPA. The selected back-end tool takes
the IF language as input and analyses the protocol modeled by HLPSL according
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to the speciﬁed security goal and properties, and then catches vulnerabilities in the
security protocols if any [Tea06a].
AVISPA helps to catch vulnerabilities in the security protocols. The security goals
that are supported by the current version of HLPSL are authentication and secrecy
goals [Tea].
Let us say that Alice and Bob want to exchange a session key before starting a
new session [Tea06a]. Alice starts by asking a trusted third party to help her with
the exchange, assuming that the trusted third party server shares a secret key (Kas)
between him and Alice, and another secret key (Kbs) between him and Bob:
• A ->S: {Kab} Kas
Alice generates the session key Kab, encrypts it with the Kas and then sends
the encrypted message to the server who is the only one who can decrypt the
message.
• S ->B: {Kab} Kbs
The server in his turn encrypts the Kab with the Kbs and then sends it to
Bob who can decrypt the message. Then Alice and Bob can securely exchange
information using the Kab.
The previous protocol seems to be secure; the properties that both Alice and Bob are
looking for is the secrecy of the Kab. To model the previous protocol using AVISPA,
we need to initialize three roles’ structures: role Alice, role Bob and role server. Every
role structure is composed of parameters and a state data structure that represents
the role state. The role state can be changed only according to the rules that control
the state transition. These rules must be speciﬁed in the role structure. A role’s state
transitions are speciﬁed in the transition section within each role.
85
For example, the following role structure represents the trusted third party server.
there are three agents in the parameters attached to role server: A, B, and S. S
represents the trusted server. A and B represent Alice and Bob respectively, and
that can be extracted from the context of the whole program. Kas and Kbs are some
of the parameters and they represent the shared key between the server and Alice
or Bob respectively. SND and RCV are the channels that are under dy’s control.
The channel “dy” stands for Dolev-Yao intruder model [Tea06b, DY81]; it is the only
intruder model that is supported by AVISPA. The Dolev-Yao model assumes that
the intruder can impersonate another user, intercept transmitted messages over dy
channels and may be able to alter messages depending on the knowledge s/he has or
acquires [Tea06b, DY81].
role server(A,B,S : agent,
Kas,Kbs : symmetric_key,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
played_by S def=
local State: nat, Kab: symmetric_key
init State := 1
transition
step1. State = 1 /\ RCV({Kab}_Kas) =|>
State:= 3 /\ SND({Kab}_Kbs)
end role
The initial state is one as indicated by init State := 1. In the transition section,
the state may change from State = 1 into State = 3 only if the server receives the
key Kab encrypted by Kas. In this case, the state is changed and the server sends
the key Kab encrypted by Kbs. Roles Alice and Bob can be modeled in AVISPA as
the following:
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role alice(A,B,S : agent,
Kas : symmetric_key,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
played_by A def=
local State: nat, Kab: symmetric_key
init State := 0
transition
step1. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State:= 2 /\ SND({Kab}_Kas)
end role
role bob(A,B,S : agent,
Kbs : symmetric_key,
SND, RCV : channel (dy))
played_by B def=
local State: nat, Kab: symmetric_key
init State := 4
transition
step1. State = 4 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State:= 6 /\ SND({Kab}_Kas)
end role
The signal “start” in the RCV(start) in role Alice is a special signal used to start the
protocol, and then the selected backend tries all possible intruder interactions to gain
more knowledge about secrets that are used between legitimate interacting parties.
Figure 21 shows the ﬁnite state machine for Alice, Bob and the trusted server. You










Figure 21: Simple session key exchange protocol represented by FSM.
6.4 Attack on the Grimen Model
We analyzed the presented protocol and found two security attacks. The ﬁrst attack
happens because there is nothing that can prevent the software attacker from forward-
ing the MG to another VS, and then the forwarded MG produces a new transport key
and sends that key to the SS. There is nothing to tell the SS that the MG is a copy,
not the original. In this case the server will respond with the media key encrypted
with the new generated transport key provided by the pirated MG. Another attack
appears because the generation of the transport key is done by the VS, because the
VS executable ﬁle is stored in the client environment. Thus the client has the chance
to statically or dynamically analyze the code and learn the memory address of the
transport key.
The main problem with this key exchange protocol comes from the fact that there
is nothing to distinguish any instances of MG. All of them have the same features and
no individualization technique has been attached to them. The secondary problem is
due to the fact that the client has enough time to statically or dynamically analyze
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the VS. One way to prevent the previous attacks is to individualize the MG for each
client and to store the transport key in an unpredictable place. In the next Section
we will discuss how to achieve both goals.
6.4.1 Attack Analysis
We translated the Grimen et al. key exchange proposal into the following messages:
1- MG → S: [Nm.Tki.MG]Ks . hash(MG.VS.Nm.Tki)
Where MG: The identity of the mobile guard
S: The identity of the security server
Nm: nonce generated by MG for authentication purposes
Tki: transport key for session i, a generated symmetric key randomly generated
by MG, used to transport the media key for the ith trust interval session.
Hash: one way hash function.
Ks: public key for S.
VS: is the instructions of the viewer software along with MGs instructions, see
Figure 18.
“.”: concatenation.
2- S → MG: [Nm|Ns|S]Km
Where Km: public key for MG.
3- MG → S: [Ns|MG]Ks
4- S → MG: [Mki|S]Tki
Where Mki: media key for the trust interval ith session. Figure 22 depicts the
protocol exchanged between the two roles.
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Figure 22: Grimen et al. Key exchange protocol simulation
We translated the previous message exchanges into HLPSL, see Appendix A, and
simulated the attack. Figure 23 shows the attack simulation. i represents the intruder
entity who is trying to gain access to the media key for all sessions. An intruder is
a forwarded MG, i.e., an illegal copy of MG, who knows the public key of MG. The
ﬁrst message shows that the intruder generates a transport key and a new nonce, and
encrypts them with SS’s public key. Then, the intruder generates a checksum that
is a result of applying code instructions into a hash function, these instructions are:
ﬁxed parts of the binary code of the VS and MG, transport key and nonce. Then the
intruder sends the result to SS. SS extracts the transport key and nonce, and then
calculates the checksum code, since the VS has all inputs for the hash function, and
then compares the result with received information. Upon successful veriﬁcation, the
SS creates a nonce and then sends the SS’s nonce along with MG’s nonce all encrypted
with MG’s public key. The intruder who has the MG’s public key can extract the
SS’s nonce and then encrypt it with SS’s public key and then send it to SS. The SS
believes that he is talking to a legal MG, and then encrypts the media key for ith
session with the transport key. This leads to an attack since the intruder can extract
that media key. We assume that forwarding the Mobile Guard to an illegal user is
a DRM attack, which means that the illegal user uses indirectly the MG public key
or at least the pirated MG can decrypt any messages that have been encrypted with
MG’s public key.
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Figure 23: Attack trace simulation for Grimen, et al.’s key exchange protocol
The problem with the Grimen et al. solution is that generating a new transport
key from any MG instance does not correspond to the validity of any MG instance,
thus any message from a pirated MG is accepted. A solution to prevent the previous
attack is to give the ability for the SS to distinguish each MG instance. We can
achieve this distinction by individualizing all legal MG copies.
6.5 The Solution
Apple’s DRM solution used three keys to protect its products: master key, repository
key and client key. The product media is encrypted with the master key, the master
key is encrypted with the client key, and the encrypted master key is attached to
the protected content media. When the user asks for a license to use the product
media, the server that locally stores the client key sends the requesting user a license
that includes the client key encrypted with the repository key. The application that
presents the product media at the client side has the repository key and is attached
with a secret algorithm embedded in the presentation software. The protection mech-
anism is dependent on keeping the secret algorithm hidden from the user. Each user
has a distinct client key and repository, which simpliﬁes the license individualization
process. The client key is randomly created by the server and saved in the server’s
database for further use. The repository key is calculated from serial number of the
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ﬁrst hard disk, BIOS version, CPU name and the ID of windows operating system,
which is assumed to be unique [GMM06a].
In the Microsoft DRM solution the product media are encrypted with a content key
and the content key is encrypted with client keys. When the user asks for a license to
use the product media, the license server sends the license that contains the encrypted
content key to the user. In the client side, there is a blackbox ﬁle that contains the
client key. Each client has an individualized blackbox, which means each instance of
a blackbox can only work for a speciﬁc machine. The protection mechanism relies
on keeping the blackbox hidden from the user access, which simpliﬁes the license
individualization process [GMM06a].
OMA DRM standard encrypts the product media with a content encryption key
(CEK), the CEK is encrypted with a DRM agent’s public key and then inserted into
a right object (RO). This process cryptographically binds an RO into DRM agent.
Each DRM agent has a unique public and private user key; when a DRM agent asks
for a right object to use a speciﬁc product, the server, who is responsible for creating
right objects, can obtain the DRM agent’s public key, and create a unique right object
for each DA that includes the CEK key, which is encrypted with the public key of a
DA. Only the DA who has the corresponding private key can use that RO and get
the CEK [OMA08a].
From the previous solutions we have two software solutions and one hardware
solution for the end-user individualization process. The case that we are working
with needs to prevent an end user from forwarding the MG to another user. To
do this, we need to individualize each MG and make MG code not to work on any
other user. We suggest that the SS, which is responsible for generating an MG,
needs to authenticate each user and then embed a unique identity (Ticket) in the
MG. The security server is going to accept only one request for media decryption key
from each legal MG instance per trust interval. Due to the fact that the generation
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of transport key is unpredictable to both SS and user, the ticket value along with
generated transport key will be the unique identiﬁer for each MG per trust interval.
When the SS receives two requests for the same MG that have the same ticket and
a diﬀerent transport key, the second key request will not receive any response. This
will prevent a pirated MG instance from successfully attacking the model previously
discussed. Here is the modiﬁed protocol:
1- MG → S: [msg]Km . hash(MG.VS.Nm.Tki.Ticket)
Where msg = [Nm|Tki|MG|T icket]Ks
2- S → MG: [Nm.Ns.S]Km
3- MG → S: [Ns|MG]Ks
4- S →MG: [Mki|S]Tki Where Km here is a symmetric shared key between the
MG and the SS, and the Ticket is the unique value for each generated MG.
Before SS delivers an MG to a valid VS, it embeds a symmetric key Km into
the generated MG. If a legitimate user receives a valid MG, and then forwards that
received MG to his friend, both MGs will have the same identity (ticket). Each MG
is going to run and generate a unique transport key at the client host; this makes a
checksum calculation unique since the transport key is one of the hash function inputs.
We will call the result of the hash function a checksum. When both MGs send the
ﬁrst message, which contains: nonce, random generated transport key, mobile guard
identity and ticket all encrypted with the SS’s public key and then again encrypted
with shared key (Ks), the second part of the massage is the checksum. The SS can
extract the ticket value and the transport key and use them to calculate the checksum.
The SS compares the received checksum with the one it calculates, if both match then
the MG has sent correct information. The SS checks the ticket value, if it receives it
for the ﬁrst time, then the MG is legal, so it will respond with the second message. If
it receives the ticket for the second time, and if the checksum is the same, then it can
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safely reply to the second message, assuming that its previous response was lost in
the network. If the SS receives the same ticket with a diﬀerent checksum, this means
that an illegal MG is sending the second request, in this case the SS will not reply to
the request. The second message contains a generated nonce from the SS side, MG’s
nonce and the SS identity all encrypted with the shared key Km. The third message
is from the MG side and contains: SS’s nonce and MG’s identity all encrypted with
SS’s public key. Now the SS and MG are mutually authenticated, the forth message
is from SS side and contains the media key for the ith session and the SS’s identity
all encrypted with the transport key for ith session.
To prevent the software hacker from discovering the transport key in the VS space
by using static or dynamic analysis, the MG needs to create a random Transport Key
and store it in a random place in the VS, or keep it in MG space, note that the
contents of MG is not predicted for a short time. The VS should implement a way
to call the transport key generation from the plug-in MG instance. This will prevent
the end user from knowing the location of the transport key for a short time.
In the solution we provide, the SS only accepts the ﬁrst media key request for each
unique ticket, and rejects any subsequent request for the same ticket with diﬀerent
checksum. We model the proposed solution for Grimen et al. protocol and validate
it using AVISPA tool. We show the HLSPL code in Appendix B. We ran the new
protocol on AVISPA and did not catch any attack. We therefore believe that our
protocol is correct and helps the SS to authenticate valid instances of MG.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed Grimen, et al. model that is assumed to achieve persis-
tent protection for delivered content media. The protection used in the model is based
on software-based protection, which makes it fast to be deployed and ﬂexible to be
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Figure 24: Revised Grimen, et al.’s key exchange protocol simulation
distributed among an acceptable number of users. Grimen, et al. make the software
based protection valid for a short time period called a trust interval, and this software
protection is periodically changed. They assume that the protection software can-
not be defeated within the trust interval because Grimen, et al. assumed obfuscated
protection software, and they have added a validation mechanism to the protection
software. Grimen, et al. assume that they can provide an extended range of persis-
tent protection to the delivered media content. The assumption the author made was
valid because the protection method is changed once the trust interval expires. We
have veriﬁed the assumption claimed; we used AVISPA model checker to verify the
protocol used in the Grimen, et al. model and found that there were defects in the
protocol that claimed to achieve persistent protection for delivered content media.
We have ﬁxed the protocol and then we have veriﬁed the modiﬁed model and found
that it is working with no bug. Thus, the software hacker has little opportunity to
hack the improved protection solution even if s/he is given enough time and suitable
tools. The only problem with the model is that it is based on unicast distribution,
and thus it is not scalable.
To conclude, persistent protection that is a result of using software based pro-
tection is ﬂexible and a promising solution for CP to deploy. We found our target,
ﬂexible persistently protected method, especially when the clients are general purpose
computers or laptops. The scalability of the model can be improved if we change the
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underlying distribution mechanisms from unicast distribution into multicast distribu-
tion, and that is our next step.
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Chapter 7
Scalable Persistent Protection in
Multicast Content Media Delivery
Now, we can observe that many DRM systems suﬀer from using the same protection
scheme for a long time, which gives the software hacker the opportunity to hack the
protection solution given enough time and suitable tools. Grimen et al. [GMM06a,
GMM06b] analyzed DRM weaknesses, and then proposed a secure software-based
DRM system that prevents the DRM attacker from penetrating the DRM system for
a short period of time. However, their solution is not scalable because changing the
key as well as the mobile guard every short period will exhaust the SS. Although care
has been taken, by Grimen et al.’s model, to replace the protection mechanism every
trust interval, the Grimen model does not prevent a user from forwarding the mobile
guard to his friends, which is a ﬂow that allows illegal end users to illegally access
protected media. We found that error in the Grimen model and presented a corrected
version, see Chapter 6.
It is known that multicast as a distribution mechanism has the advantages of
lowering the price of distribution, speeding up the delivery process, lowering the
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resource usage of both the source and network and improving the network bandwidth
[J. 07]. We presented Multicast Security Architecture (MSA) in Section 3.3, which
works side by side with scheduled content media distribution. The main problem
with the multicast security model is that it does not prevent a dishonest customer
from forwarding any delivered data.
The goal in this chapter is to ﬁnd an implementation and an architecture that
permits changing the underlying Grimen et al. model from unicast into multicast
transmission mechanism. In our opinion, if we could marry the multicast security
model with the Grimen et al. model, in this case we could acquire the advantages of
both approaches: scalability and a long period of persistent protection.
In this chapter, we propose a scalable model that enables a periodic replacement
of the protection mechanisms, thus extending the lifetime of the protection. We
then explore how to apply the ideas in the case of multicast data distribution. After
detailing the protocols between the major parts of this model, we show the results of
a formal validation of the security of these exchanges.
This material provides the scalability that is a necessary prerequisite to meeting
our second goal.
7.1 Improved MSA Model
To increase the scalability of current DRM systems, we need the network service
provider to contribute to the solution. The NSP is able to authenticate the individ-
ual customers, deliver the service to their customers, and account for their resource
usage [IA06], as well as monitor end user’s behavior. In our opinion, adding per-
sistent protection properties to the multicast content media distribution system is
the way to close the security holes generated by dishonest customers. Satisfying the
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scalability requirement, which leads to the use of multicast distribution, is hard to
achieve without the help of the network service provider. Buyens et al. [BMJ07]
stated that building and implementing DRM must consider the following fuctional
requirements in the DRM development phase: interoperability, modiﬁability, extend-
ability, usability, testability, availability, security, scalability and performance. They
recognized key DRM blocks for licensing, access, content media handling, abuser
identiﬁcation, content media importing, consumer tracking, and payment. Michiels,
et al. [MVJDD05] determined DRM services from diﬀerent view points: consumer,
producer and publisher. They proposed a layered architecture that is composed of
multiple DRM services. As hinted by Buyens et al. and Michiels, et al. we strongly
believe that we need the following services:
1. Content media protection (Encryption service): due to using the public network
for delivering content media, the most feasible way to control the content media
access is to encrypt the content media.
2. Authorization service: A service to authorize customers who are entitled to
see the content media by delivering them the capabilities to access protected
content media such as the encryption key.
3. Trust service: A service that provides the trust relations that need to be estab-
lished between the sender and the distributor, the distributor and the receiver,
as well as the receiver and the received objects. Usually, the trust service is
established based on content media, sender and receiver authentication.
4. Usage accounting: A service to account for the content media usage.
5. Policy statement: A service that allows the content owner to specify terms and
conditions, usage rights and the payment fees, as well as any related issue for
delivery agreements. There is a need for a rights expression language (REL) to
express rights and policies.
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6. Assets unforgeable proof: A service that provides a proof that the assets pro-
duction is generated by an authorized entity. It is achieved by signing integrity
hash-value. The signature is done by CP, so it gives a proof for originality.
7. Secure storage: A service used to hide sensitive information. Hidden informa-
tion should not be revealed unless an authorized entity allowed it.
8. Rights enforcing: an authorized protection agent that is authenticated by con-
tent owner and that has the responsibility of decrypting the content media.
That agent has the decryption key and is responsible for hiding this key away
from the customer as well as enforcing terms and conditions.
9. Integrity insertion: A Service that enables the content media integrity veriﬁca-
tion.
10. Integrity checker: A service that works as a detective and that has the respon-
sibility for checking the validity of the received product.
11. User privacy assurance: a service that guarantees that the user’s private infor-
mation is not in the hands of a privacy attacker.
12. Individualization service: this service enables the distributor of the hardware-
based or software-based protection to distinguish between diﬀrent instances
of them, and prevent the attacker from extending his penetration into wider
environments.
13. Watermark and ﬁngerprint injection service: this service injects a unique ID
that represents either the owner of content media or the paying customer, so
that it enables the traceback to the source of illegal distribution.
14. Web spider: search for compromised content media across the Internet and
discover the illegality of distributing stolen content media.
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Table 4: DRM Basic Requirements VS DRM Services
DRM requirement DRM services











R5 Assets unforgeable proof









R11 Not yet determined
15. Protection scheme renewal: this service determines the exact period needed to
replace the protection scheme, revokes the old protection scheme, and performs
the replacing action.
16. Monitor: this service tracks the behavior of the end user, it periodically sends
feedback to the server monitor, if certain condition(s) are met.
Table 4 maps previous services to the eleven requirements we collected in Chapter 5.
In the generic DRM model the network service provider has no role in the DRM
plane. It works as a transporter, and thus the relationship between the CP and DA is
one-to-one. In the world of multicast content media distribution the content provider
cannot directly identify, authenticate, authorize, account and track customers, as a
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result of moving the provider-receiver relationship from one-to-one into one-to-many
or many-to-many. The provider is only responsible for the production related issues.
The network service provider is the best place for doing the customer identiﬁcation,
authorization, accounting and tracking [J. 07, IA06]. Based on this observation, we
suggest allocating the previous 16 services into the following roles:
1. The content provider (CP): is the entity that is responsible for providing the
content media to the end users, it could be responsible for:




2. The Merchant (MR): a role that is responsible for providing a valid token to a
valid requester, it is responsible for enabling the following services:
(a) Assets unforgeable proof.
(b) Rights enforcing.
(c) Protection scheme renewal.
3. The content media distributor: in the context of multicast service, the major
distributor is the network service provider, this role could be responsible for:
(a) Usage accounting.
(b) Individualization service.
(c) Watermark and ﬁngerprint injection service.
(d) Web spider.
(e) Monitor.
4. The mobile protection (MP) agent: a role that is responsible for:
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(a) Integrity insertion.
(b) Content media protection.
(c) Trust service.
(d) Rights enforcing.
5. The mobile guard (MG) agent: a role that is responsible for:
(a) Integrity checking.
(b) Authorization service
(c) Providing a secure storage.
(d) Sender authentication.
(e) Rights enforcing.
We have not allocated a place for user privacy assurance. However, we believe
that this service will not aﬀect the DRM workﬂow, so we will leave it for future study.
7.2 Persistent Protection in Multicast Content Me-
dia Delivery Model
In this section we suggest a persistent protection model for content media using
a multicast distribution model. We strongly believe that merging ideas that exist
within the Atwood and Grimen models will result in a persistent protection and
scalable content media distribution model, so we build our solution based on MSA.
If the majority of the end users are using general PCs, it is not feasible to use tam-
per proof hardware to hide the protection secrets. A better solution is to use tamper
resistant software that provides a ﬂexible and pluggable solution. MSA protects the
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content media in the network layer, but does not protect it in the application layer.
We suggest adding new functionalities to MR and NSP, which inject a DRM agent to
an individual EU. We will use the same name as in the Grimen model for this agent,
a mobile guard plug-in (MG). We will ignore the FI role at this stage. The MG (tam-
per resistant object) helps to achieve application protection [GMM06a, GMM06b],
it embeds the decryption algorithm and decryption keys that are needed to decrypt
the stream media as well as other mechanisms to enable monitoring the EU. We will
add a mobile protection (MP) role, which embeds mechanisms for protecting content
media. The CP and the end user have to have no access to these secrets in order to
reach a global solution.
The MR is responsible for generating the MG, MG authorizes the EU to legally use
the content media in a controlled manner. The MG has embeded in it the terms and
conditions, enforcing and decryption mechanisms, and other mechanisms for checking
and validating the EU environment.
The NSP is the entity that can easily track and account for the EU’s activity, so
the generated MG should be delivered to the NSP who in turn is going to securely
deliver it to each individual EU. Because the NSP does not trust the EU, employing
the mobile guard is a way to load a method on the customer’s device. A Java applet
is a self-contained program that loads mobile code in a remote machine, and executes
that code under a standard virtual machine. Java has come to be trusted by the end
user community, so this represents a low-risk approach for implementing the ideas.
We assume that a contract is established between the following entities:
• The NSP and the MR.
• The MR and the CP.
We assume that the following assumptions are valid:
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1. The CP trusts the MR.
2. The NSP trusts the MR.
3. The CP is specialized for generating and encoding the content media.
4. The MR is specialized in selling content media and generating the encryption and
decryption mobile code for content media: mobile protection (MP) and mobile
guard (MG) [GMM06b].
5. The MP and MG are executable plug-in ﬁles.
6. The attacker does not have advance knowledge about the forming, content and
production of the MG and MP.
7. The network service provider and the end user share a preshared-key, and will call
this key an access-key.
8. The merchant and the end user share another access-key.
9. The attacker does not have advance knowledge about any access-keys shared be-
tween the NSP and the EU, and the MR and EU.
There will be a mechanism that establishes the access-key between the NSP and
EU, or the EU may receive this access key by telephone, email, or by buying an
long-distance calling card, and that card contains the access-key.
Similarly, there exists another access-key between the MR and the end user, and
this could be established by creating an account at the merchant side, and then
the merchant uses the account name and the user password to generate the access-
key. The end user is able to generate the same access-key if s/he follows the same
procedure.
We relaxed the persistent protection deﬁnition, and in our context, it is deﬁned as
a protection with speciﬁed permission and constraint; that protection is applied to a
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speciﬁc media and it is valid for a speciﬁed time and place. In order to implement this
deﬁnition, we need to concentrate on protecting the protection software from reverse
engineering and related attacks, in other words, disallow illegal use of protection
software. The following list summarizes the threat model:
• Code modiﬁcation attack.
• Forwarding and illegal use of protection software.
• Reverse engineering attack.
Previous items are applicable to protection software.
• Message replay attack.
• Man-in-the-middle attack.
• Message integrity attacks.
The last three points are usually applicable to the security protocols
In the following subsections, we will show the new multicast model for persistent
protection distribution. The new model is an improvement to both Atwood (MSA)
and Grimen et al.’s model [J. 07, GMM06a, BA10].
7.2.1 The Content Provider (CP)
The CP is considered an artistic director to the art production, s/he is responsible
for generating and encoding the content media using the right technology tools, then
dividing each content medium into multiple pieces, where each piece has the same
duration. The CP uses speciﬁc protection executable software on each piece, this
protection software is provided by the MR. The resulting protected pieces are called
the encrypted and encoded streamed content media document (EEMD) [GMM06b,
GMM06c].
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The CP also responsible for preparing the meta data that will guide the EU where
to get the content media. The CP provides terms and conditions to the merchant
that he wants to be applied on the content media. The MR is going to record them
in its database, and hard code them in the generated MG.
7.2.2 The Content Server (CS)
The EEMD piece is a secure content to be distributed only at speciﬁc time. The CS
is responsible for starting the multicasting of each piece of the EEMD stream at the
scheduled time.
7.2.3 The Merchant (MR)
The Merchant is responsible for managing, advertising and selling the content media.
S/He works as an interface of the CP to the whole world. When the CP generates the
content media, s/he contacts the merchant and sends all required information about
the content media to be registered. The MR generates the suitable software codes
called mobile protections (MP), which are needed to protect and package the content
media. The MR generates the enforcing mechanisms for the terms and conditions and
embeds them into MG. The MR may embed a mechanism that footprints individual
instances of the EEMD. The MR receives requests from end users who are interested
in watching one of the goods, and provides them with tickets to use later to show their
eligibility for using the content media. The MR provides the NSP with all lists of
MGs that are capable to decrypt and enforce access right conditions on the requested
EEMD for each individual trust interval.
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7.2.4 The Mobile Security Codes (MP and MG)
The MR generates a list of mobile guards (MG), and mobile protection plug-in soft-
ware (MP), for each content medium. The MP embeds mechanisms to encrypt a
sequence of sub-content media with diﬀerent encryption keys and mechanisms, while
MG embeds the capabilities to decrypt the sequence of sub-content media. The MG
also has the capabilities to enforce the terms and conditions stated by the CP, as well
as, the MG should able to validate and authenticate the end user machine used to
access content media.
7.2.5 The Network Service Provider (NSP)
Since we are suggesting to use multicast as a distribution mechanism to convey the
content media from content server into many end users, the only feasible way for
content media usage accounting, in our opinion, is to asign this task to the NSP. The
reason behind our belief is when we use multicast as a distribution mechanism, and
for scalability requirement, the CP and the MR need not to be aware of the existence
of the end users, only NSP can be aware of end users without degrading the scalability
requirement [J. 07].
The NSP receives a ticket from the EU as proof for his/her eligibility to access
the content media. The ticket is valid for a certain time period and is unique for each
request. The NSP is responsible for validating any request from the end user and
contacting the MR to request for getting the suitable MG for the requested media
at speciﬁc time interval. Once the NSP gets the suitable list of MG, s/he clones and
individualizes each of them by inserting the user ticket in a predetermined place in
each cloned MG, this place cannot be predicted by the individual EU for short period
of time. This individualization helps to trace back the source of illegal distribution
in order to mark him/her “Wanted”.
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7.2.6 The End User (EU)
The end users are users of machines such as laptops, personal computers, cell phones
and so on. The EU searches through the web for some content media to watch, then
contacts the MR who is responsible for issuing him a ticket. The EU buys a ticket
and then provides that ticket to the NSP, who in turn will connect him to watch
the media. The EU needs to install a standard software called viewer software (VS)
developed by the standard third party, Section 7.2.7 gives more details of the viewer
software.
7.2.7 Viewer Software
The following description of the VS ideas comes from [GMM06b, GMM06c].
Every client machine needs to use standard viewer software (VS), which been
developed by the MR. The VS is developed in such a way as to accept an instance of
MG. The MG hides a decryption key for a speciﬁc piece of the EEMD, and then the
VS renders the result on the screen of the client machine. The VS mainly contains
two parts: ﬁxed and dynamic parts. The ﬁxed part consists of the text code and
some parts of the data section that needs to be unchanged. The dynamic part is
the plug-in software, which is dynamically attached to the memory space of the VS,
which is MG. Applying the ﬁxed part of the viewer software into a one way hash
function leads to a resulting hash-value that is known by all parties.
The plug-in software also has a ﬁxed part and dynamic part. The ﬁxed part
consists of the instructions and constant static data. Apply these ﬁxed parts to one
way hash function results in a hash-value which should be known to the generator of
the plug-in software. We will use these facts to check the validity of VS and plug-in
software attached to the VS.
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The plug-in software is responsible for carrying out the decryption mechanism and
the decryption key in order to decrypt a speciﬁc EEMD piece. The plug-in software
also provides validity checking of the VS along with the plug-in software itself. We
will call the plug-in software mobile guard (MG) as been called by Grimen because
it checks the destination viewer and ensures its validity and security. In the next
section, we will present the protocol between NSP, MR and EU of the new multicast
content media distribution that is scalable and provides persistent protection to the
distributed content media.
7.3 The New Model’s Workﬂow
We suggest the following workﬂow for the new system:
1- The MR generates two classes of executable plug-ins: mobile protection (MP)
and mobile guard (MG). The mobile protection is mainly responsible for en-
crypting and packaging a content media piece; on the other side, the mobile
guard is mainly responsible for unpackaging and decrypting a piece of content
media. Both classes are also responsible for checking the integrity of the host
that one plug-in instance is going to be hosted in.
2- There will be a series of mobile guards MGi and a mobile protection MPi. MGi
and MPi symbols represent MG and MP instances. The MGi will be only valid
for a certain period of time, we will call this period “trust interval” as has been
advised by Grimen [GMM06b, GMM06c]. Every trust interval should be served
by only one instance of MGi. Suppose that the trust interval is going to be one
hour, then there will be 24 MGi to cover one day.
3- The CP generates and encodes the content media, then divides it into multiple
pieces of a certain time slot.
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4- The CP contacts the MR to register the media information and speciﬁcations
such as the time schedule to disseminate the content media, number of pieces
of the protected media, the usage policy, terms and conditions for using the
content media, stars, genre and the price of the content media.
5- The MR generates a mobile protection that is responsible for generating the
EEMD. It then sends the sequence of MPi to the CP. Also, the MR generates
a corresponding list of plug-in MGi for unpackaging the content media and
reﬂecting the terms and conditions that the CP wants to enforce at the client
side.
6- The CP generates EEMD. The CP may have the option to select diﬀerent prop-
erties for the encryption code, such as, which cryptography and authentication
algorithm and key length. The CP sends EEMD to the CS, and gives him the
time to start distributing the content media.
7- The MR advertises the content media and provides the time schedule, usage
policies and corresponding meta data for the content media. S/He is responsible
for selling the tickets for the content media.
8- The EU contacts the MR and gets the needed information about the content
media.
9- The end user creates an account at the MR site, and provides some necessary
information such as name, address, NSP identity and so on. The created account
has account login and password. That password may used as an input to hash
function to generate a unique secret key.
10- The EU provides the needed funds to watch a speciﬁc content media. The MR
creates a ticket and sends it the end user. The client gets a ticket.
11- The ticket is used as a proof of successful payment. The ticket composed of
ticket ID, a nonce generated by the MR, a nonce generated by the VS, the MR
ID, the NSP ID, the EEMD ID and client ID.
111
The idea behind using viewer software is to prevent the user from directly
accessing the content media, or accessing any capabilities that allow him/her to
access the content media. The viewer software works as an interface between
the CP and EU. In one side it allows the EU to indirectly use the content
media, and on the other side, it enforces the terms and conditions that need
to be applied on the content media. Since the VS is software that lives in the
user’s environment, the EU may have full control on the machine he is using,
which may lead him to hack the VS. To prevent EU from hacking the VS, we
need a periodic check of the VS. If there is any attack on the VS, then there
should be a mechanism to stop sending the media ﬂow to the compromised VS.
Since the NSP is the Internet interface to all EU, we will add VS validity
checking function to his/her responsibilities. It is more feasible for him to do
that than for other entity. One way to check VS validity, is to send checking
software to the EU side, we call it “mobile guard”. That mobile guard has the
properties that have been mentioned in Section 7.2.7, which allows the periodic
conﬁguring of the VS by periodic renewing of the mobile guard itself. If the
validity check is not satisﬁed, the NSP stops sending the media ﬂow and any
subsequent MG to the suspicious VS. If the validity checking is passed, a speciﬁc
signal is sent to the VS to start doing the decryption and encoding process to
the media piece that is under ﬂow.
Next we will provide the authentication protocol that applies between the CP,
MR and VS before the VS receives the MG plug-in.
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7.4 Authentication Protocols among MR, NSP and
EU
In this section we will start with the authentication protocols between MR, NSP and
VS before the VS receives a new code piece allowing him to decrypt and encode the
content media peice. Here is the protocol control ﬂow:
1- The end user creates an account on the MR site, and provides some necessary
information such as name, address, NSP identity and so on. The created account
has account login and password. The account, password and nonces generated
by the two parties (EU & MR) are be used as an input to a hash function to
generate a unique secret key.
2- The EU contacts the MR via the viewer software and views posted information
about the content media, then sends a request to buy a ticket for the content
media s/he is interested in. The EU generates a nonce and provides the needed
funds to watch a speciﬁc content media.
VS → MR: VS.NSP.MR.RequestKvm
where:
“A → B: Message”: means A sends B a message.
. means text concatenation.
Request = [Nvs.V S.NSP.MR.Minfo.Money]KMR
VS: End user’s viewer software’s identity.
MR: The merchant’s identity.
Nvs: is a nonce generated by VS.
NSP: Network service provider identity.
Minfo: media information.
KMR: is the public key of the MR.
Kvm: is the symmetric key (access-key) shared between VS and MR.
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Figure 25: The content of the ticket.
Money: is a token that represents suﬃcient money for the requested media.
3- The MR generates a nonce and a ticket and sends them to the end user. The
client gets a ticket.
MR → VS: VS.NSP.MR.ResponseKvm
where:
Response: [V S.NSP.MR.K.Nvs.Nmr]Kvm.Ticket.
Nmr: is a nonce generated by MR.
K: is Symmetric key generated by MR.
Ticket: [K.Nvs.Nmr.T icketID.Minfo.MR.NSP.V S]KNSP .
KNSP: is the public key for the NSP.
TicketID: is the identity of the ticket.
MR: is the merchant identity.
4- The ticket is used as a proof of successful payment. The ticket is composed of
Ticket ID, nonce generated by VS, nonce generated by MR, MR ID, NSP ID,
VS ID and a symmetric key generated by the MR, see Figure 25.
Notice that the client cannot open the ticket, since it is encrypted by NSP’s
public key. Only the NSP can open the ticket and extract its content media.
5- For validating the ticket, there will be policy statements that have been nego-
tiated between the NSP and the MR for that purpose. For example, one policy
statement may say “refer every ticket to the MR for veriﬁcation purposes”,
while another may say, “if the ticket starts with a speciﬁc properties and has
been signed by the MR, accept it and then send the money later”. This will give
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ﬂexibility and decouple the interaction between the NSP and the MR. Either
the NSP is going to get information about the ticket’s validity or is going to get
a template so that he can match or he is going to get a policy statement on how
validation of tickets is taking place. Also the NSP has the policy that deﬁnes
what has to be done on every step of an interaction between him and any other
entity. We will not give any detail on any ﬁnancial and marketing interactions,
which is not the concern of our DRM solution.
6- Here is an example of how the NSP validates the ticket. The VS sends the NSP
the ticket:
VS → NSP: VS.NSP.MR.MediaAccessRequestKvn
where:
MediaAccessRequest: Ticket.[Nvs.Nmr]K
Kvn: is a shared key (access-key) between NSP and VS. Since the EU is cus-
tomer of the NSP, there will be a secure tunnel established between them.
7- The NSP send the following request to the MR.
NSP → MR: TicketID.ChkTkReqK
where:
ChkTkReq: [Nvs.Nmr.NSP.MR.V S.T icketID]KMR
KMR: is the public key of the MR.
8- After the ticket has been veriﬁed, the MR sends all MGs that are responsible
for decrypting and enforcing conditions on each piece of the EEMD. Sometimes,
the MR needs to be updated with the number of customers connected to the
NSP for the purpose of accounting.
MR → NSP: TicketID.ChkResK
where:
ChkRes: [Nvs.Nmr.NSP.MR.V S.T icketID.MG]KNSP
MG = PCi.MKi
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The Mobile Guard includes the decryption keys, public and private keys, en-
forcement mechanisms and integrity checking mechanisms.
PCi: is the protection code for all media pieces that are distributed at trust
interval i.
MKi: is the media key for all media pieces that are distributed by the CS at
trust interval i.
9- The NSP individualizes the MG by injecting the VS identity and the ticket,
which is unique for any individual client. Then s/he provides the VS with
the MG that will help in decrypting the content media ﬂow when CS starts
distributing it.
NSP → VS: VS.NSP.MR.[Nmr.Nvs.MGi]Kvn
where:
MGi: [PC.Nmr.Nvs.V S.MKi]K
MGI is an individualized piece of code for the speciﬁc VS. Note that the injected
MKi within the MG may not be the true media key, and the correct MKi will
be sent by the NSP only after the VS and MG veriﬁcation is completed.
10- The VS calls the MG and allows him to run, then the MG will compute the
hash-value of the MG along with the VS, and then send the computed value to
the NSP.
VS → NSP: VS.NSP.MR.[Nmr.Nvs.HashV alue]K
where:
HashValue: the hash-value of result in applying the VS and MG to a speciﬁc
one-way secure hash-function.
11- Since the NSP has all information to compute the hash-value, s/he is able to
compare the received hash-value and validate the end user’s integrity, then s/he
send the right media key to the end user.
NSP → VS: VS.NSP.MR.[V S.NSP.Nvs.Nmr.MK]Kvn
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Figure 26: Protocol negotiated between VS, NSP and MR
Figure 26 illustrates the protocol simulation between the VS, the NSP and the MR
in order to deliver the MG instance to each client.
7.5 Discussion on the Protocol
The end user interacts with the NSP and MR via the VS. The VS works as an
intermediate channel between the EU and the NSP and MR. The end user has the
ability to extract the working logic of the VS, so it is susceptible to abuse by end-users
due to their static framework.
When the VS receives an individualized instance of the MG, then the resulting VS
itself is individualized. If the end user tries to forward the individualized VS or MG
to others, this forwarding needs to be invalidated. It is required that the VS execute
the received MG, which computes the hash-value of the individualized VS and sends
the result to the NSP. The hash-value is a result of secure one-way hash-function;
the input of the hash-function is the static part of the VS plus the static part of the
received MG, end user ticket, shared-key and MG’s public and private keys. The
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NSP knows in advance the content and the values of all previous ﬁelds, but the end
user must not know. Once the NSP receives the correct hash-value, then s/he will
respond by sending the sub-media-key to the requesting VS. When an MG computes
the hash-value, theoretically, the result is a unique value. When the NSP receives the
hash-value, s/he accepts the ﬁrst valid request and invalidates any other request that
carries the same hash-value, assuming that any other request that carries the same
hash value is a result of forwarded VS or/and MG. This will prevent forwarding and
illegal use of protection software.
The end user cannot modify the VS without being detected by the NSP, because
any modiﬁcation on the VS will lead to a wrong hash-value generated by the MG,
Knowing that the content of the MG is not predicted by the end user within the trust
interval [GMM06a, BA10], this will prevent code modiﬁcation attack and reverse
engineering attack.
What we discussed so far is a software solution, which is more ﬂexible than the
hardware one. Generating multiple instances of obscured PMG and then multicasting
them to valid customers via the NSP is an economically feasible solution, especially
when the majority of these customers are general PCs [GMM06a]. Knowing that
general PCs do not include any tamper resistant hardware, distributing such hardware
among users will not be a cost eﬀective solution, because the end user does not
appreciate more cost, as well as the NSP or the CP or any other participants.
Since our intent is to maintain a secure environment and prevent message replay
attack, man-in-the-middle attack and message integrity attacks, it is necessary to
validate the proposed protocol. We used the AVISPA tool to validate the previous
protocol, the property we set is to validate the following:
• Authentication on nonces generated by VS and MR
• The secrecy of the tickets generated by MR
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• The secrecy of the mobile guard generated by MR
• The secrecy of session key K that needs to be shared between VS and NSP
• The secrecy of the media-key.
The result of running the protocol validation shows that the attacker has no chance
to discover the ticket’s contents, the MG’s contents, the value of the session key K and
the value of the media-key. The attacker cannot discover the value of the VS’s nonce
and the MR’s nonce. This proves that both authentication and secrecy goals are
satisﬁed. We use the four back ends that are supported by AVISPA in this protocol
validation, and the result out of the four back ends shows that the protocol is safe.
What we model is the protocol that takes place between the major parties: the
NSP, the MR and the EU. Other interactions that happen between the MR and the
CP, and between the CP and the CS are one-to-one interactions, and that kind of in-
teractions is secure assuming that there a secure channel between the MR and CP and
another secure channel between the CP and CS. We believe that Challenge/Response
Authentication Protocol, version 2, to establish an authenticated one-to-one connec-
tion is enough [TH]. The interactions between the ﬁnancial institution and other
roles within MSA architecture is been validated by Parham and Atwood [PA11].
Within the trust interval, if the VS wants to change to diﬀerent channels that are
supported by the same merchant and allowed to be viewed using the same ticket, then
the NSP sends the new media key encrypted with the established secret key K, that
is generated by the merchant and embedded in the ticket. Another possible scenario
is that the NSP injects an asymmetric key pair in to the MG instance before sending
it the speciﬁc VS. Then the NSP encrypts any new media key using the public key.
The MG instance’s public key is not known to anyone but the NSP. This property






























































Figure 27: The MG delivery protocol
the MG’s private key may used for injecting a unique ﬁnger-print into received sub-
media document, which can be used for tracking illegal media distribution.
Figure 26 shows the result of validating the proposed protocol solution, we get the
interaction result from AVISPA tool, and the tool shows no attack on the protocol
model that we proposed.
Figure 27 depicts the interactions between the VS, the MR and the NSP in order
to securely deliver the MG to the VS. In Appendix C we provide the HLPSL model
the interactions . We may harden the hacker’s task by using obfuscation technique to
hide the software protection’s logic; also we can hide the messages interaction with a
protocol and hiding the messages content. Our protection scheme has many building
blocks, and they are as follows:
• Cryptography technology.
• Code obfuscation technology.
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• Tamper resistant object.
• Software protection renewal
• Hiding the protocol.
• Hiding the interacting tokens’ content.
• Hiding the MG’s public key.
We can allow every end user to have a domain access for the content media, in such
a way that one ticket allows one user to watch the content media via N diﬀerent
machines or VS instances that are owned by the same user. We could allow that by
permitting the user to receive N individualized MG on his N machines or VS instances,
and then the NSP counts N hash-value that comes from the same user, Afterward,
the NSP sends the suitable media keys for each machine or VS instance. This idea
gives the end user the ability to watch N diﬀerent channels that are supported by the
same merchant on N diﬀerent machines or N diﬀerent VS instance.
We will call our Model, which is a merger of MSA and Grimen model [J. 07,
GMM06a, BA10], persistent protection in multicast content media delivery (PPMCD).
This PPMCD satisﬁes the following:
• Content media protection: Achieved by encrypting the content media at the
place owned by CP, as well as using Persistent Protection ideas by hiding the
protection mechanisms and keys.
• Trust service: Achieved by hash-value validation by MG or NSP and enabling
the MG replacement, which helps to prevent hacking the MG.
• Usage accounting: Achieved by the original MSA architecture.
• Policy statement: Achieved by the original MSA architecture.
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• Rights enforcing: Achieved by embedding terms and conditions inside the MG,
while the enforcement action is done by VS. The VS is checked and approved
every trust interval when a new MG is injected into the VS. The periodic re-
placement of the MG ensures periodic reassessment of the validity of the VS,
which makes the hacking of VS infeasible. We assume the hierarchy trust rela-
tionships among all interacting parties are valid.
• Sender and Receiver authentication: Achieved by the original MSA architecture.
• Integrity checker: Achieved by the original MSA architecture.
• Individualization service: Achieved by individualizing/injecting each MG in-
stance with user’s ticket.
• Watermark and ﬁngerprint injection service: this may be achieved by embedding
ﬁngerprint injection mechanism in the MG and embedding watermark injection
mechanism in the MP.
• Protection scheme renewal: Achieved by enabling the MG replacement every
trust interval expiration, which prevents hacking the MG and VS.
• Monitor: Achieved by enabling the NSP to monitor the VS at the EU every
trust interval.
• Authorization service: Achieved by using MG idea.
• Secure storage: Achieved by using MG idea.
• Assets unforgeable proof: Achieved by the original MSA architecture.




In previous chapters, we noted that current DRM solutions do not scale when the
number of users who use this model increases above a certain level. We pointed out the
basic requirements that make the protection persistent and used these requirements
to improve both Grimen et al. model and secure multicast architecture. We proposed
a scalable software-based protection that extends the period for securing the delivered
content media. The proposed solution relies on utilizing the network service provider,
and add more privileges to him/her, and make him able to do extra tasks such as
monitoring the integrity of the end user’s protection software and individualizing a
piece of the protection software; this piece is called the mobile guard. The proposed
solution based on utilizing the NSP. We showed how this solution will help to satisfy
most of the DRM requirements. We validated the security aspects of our proposal.
By merging the Gremin, et al. model and MSA, we acquire the persistent protection
property that exists in Grimen et al. model and the scalability property that exists
in the MSA model. The weakness of the new model is the extensive load added to the
NSP because of cloning MG plug-ins and individualizing each one. The production
of each MG may be diﬀerent among diﬀerent merchants, and this leads to more time
consumption at customer side if s/he wants to switch between channels that happen
to be managed by diﬀerent merchants. This leads to uploading diﬀerent MGs at the
customer side.
To conclude, we proposed a new model that is ﬂexible and persistently protected
for delivered content media, and demonstrated that the new model is satisfying the
persistent protection requirement to a certain level.
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Chapter 8
The Persistent Protected and
Scalable Delivery Model
In Chapter 7, we proposed a persistent protection in multicast content delivery model,
which is a merger of Grimen, et al. model and multicast security architecture. The
new model has ﬁve main roles: the content provider, the merchant, the content server,
the network service provider and the end user. The idea of the merger is to acquire the
persistent protection property that exists in Grimen et al. model and the scalability
property that exists in MSA model. The weaknes of the new model is the extensive
load added to NSP in term of cloning MG plug-ins, as well as individualizing each one.
Add to this, these cloning and individualization processes need to be repeated for each
diﬀerent merchant’s customers. In this chapter, we will introduce an improved and
more scalable architecture for the persistent protection in multicast content delivery.
The new architecture is based on the persistent protection in multicast content media
delivery model discussed in Section 7.2, and it will lessen the new NSP extensive
load that resulted from cloning and individualizing MG plug-ins for each merchant’s
customers. The production of each MG may be diﬀerent for each merchant, which
will lead to more time consumption at customer side if s/he wants to switch between
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channels that happen to be managed by diﬀerent merchants. This leads to uploading
diﬀerent MGs at the customer side. We will look for ways to reduce the number of
MGs produced.
This material provides additional scalability in our system, which improves the
achievement of our second goal.
8.1 Another Improvement for MSA Model
In order to have strong and fast deployment for security, rights enforcement and
eﬃcient execution of content media distribution transactions, we introduce the mobile
security provider (MSP) role to the MSA architecture, and the main services provided
by this new role are:
a Trust service.
b Rights enforcing.
c Protection scheme renewal.
The idea behind introducing mobile security provider (MSP) is to increase the sepa-
ration of concern, as well as release the MR from some responsibilities, such as rights
enforcing and protection scheme renewal, and thus provide the merchant with more
ﬂexibilty for utilising his/her resources.
We suggest that we deﬁne a distributed MSP role for each country or territory.
That role is responsible for building a standard viewer software according to the
speciﬁcations we mentioned in Section 7.2.7.
In order to deploy our proposal, we assume the following assumptions to be valid:
125
1. The CP trusts the MR.
2. The NSP trusts the MR.
3. Both the MR and NSP trust the MSP.
4. The CP is specialized for generating and encoding the content media.
5. The MR is specialized in selling content media
6. The MSP is specialized in generating the mobile protection (MP) and mobile guard
(MG) that are responsible for encrypting and decrypting the content media.
7. The MP and MG are executable plug-in ﬁles.
The MSP is responsible for developing multimedia player software, which is com-
posed of a static part (such as a code section and some portions of a data section) and
a dynamic part (such as heap and stack sections). We assume that the static part of
the multimedia player is the stamp of the player, and we can use it to represent an
application class instance for a speciﬁc platform. The multimedia player is designed
in a way that accepts a plug-in mobile code called “mobile guard” (MG) [GMM06b],
which is a piece of executable code.
The player software works as an executable host that carries out decryption and
decoding of the EEMD. The decryption executable code and the decryption key are
embedded within the plug-in mobile guard. The main security goal of this scheme is
to protect the cryptographic code fragment and key(s) from exposure or modiﬁcation.
The player software can be run on personal computers, PDAs, mobile phones and so
on.
The MSP is also responsible for developing multimedia packager software with the
same properties as the multimedia player software, namely static and dynamic parts.
Again, the static part of the multimedia packager is the stamp, which can be used as
a representative instance of the application class used within a speciﬁc platform. The
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multimedia packager is designed in a way that accepts a plug-in mobile code called
“mobile protection” (MP), which is a piece of executable code.
The packager software functions as an executable host that carries out encryption
and encoding of the EEMD. The encryption executable code and the encryption key
are embedded inside the plug-in mobile protection. The main security purpose of this
scheme is to protect cryptographic code fragment and key(s) from being exposed or
modiﬁed. The packager software should run on high computation servers.
The MSP generates the suitable list of software mobile protection (MP), which are
needed to protect and package the content media at the CP side. S/He also generates
the enforcing mechanisms for the terms and conditions and embeds them into the
MG. The MSP may embed a mechanism that footprints individual instances of the
EEMD.
The MSP divides an entire day into epochs, periods of time, and we will use the
term “trust interval” for each epoch. The MSP generates one MP and one MG for
each epoch; thus we have a limited number of MP and MG for each day.
The MP’s and MG’s structures contain multiple encryption or decryption meth-
ods, a hash function method and multiple secret keys and public keys, some of them
are dummy and others are real. The main goal of having these elements is to confuse
the hacker, and make his job harder. Figure 28 and Figure 29 depict the MP’s and
the MG’s structures.
The MSP generates a list of MP(s), each of which is embedded with one media
key that is used to encrypt one sub-media document. Every mobile protection is
associated with one sub-media document. At the same time, the MSP generates
a list of MG(s), each of which is embedded with one media decryption key that is
used to decrypt one speciﬁc sub-media document. In other words, for each mobile




































Figure 29: Mobile guard structure
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When the CP generates the content media, s/he contacts the merchant and sends
all required information about the content media to be registered. The MR contacts
the MSP and informs him about the scheduled time for the EEMD. The MSP sends
the MR only the related MP(s) that are valid for that scheduled time.
The MR receives requests from end users who are interested in watching one of
the goods, and provide them tickets to use them later to show their eligibility for
using the content media.
A suﬃcient amount of time before the new epoch starts, the MSP sends the NSP(s)
an un-individualised MG related to that epoch. The epoch-related MG is capable of
decrypting and enforcing access right conditions on the requested sub-EEMD for that
individual epoch or trust interval. Figure 30 and Figure 31 illustrate the process of
validating the CP’s and EU’s integrity. In this case, we will have one MG for each
epoch, and that MG embeds related security associations used to decrypt each sub-
EEMD that is supposed to ﬂow at that time. All CP(s) who are supposed to protect
a sub-EEMD, which happens to be distributed in the same epoch, need to protect
the sub-EEMD using the corresponding MP. This will help to switch quickly between
diﬀerent EEMD that are supposed to be distributed during the same time interval.
Figure 32 shows the persistent protected and scalable delivery architecture’s work
ﬂow.
In the MSP there are many processes working for developing and implementing
MP(s) and MG(s). There, you will ﬁnd a library bank that contains code fragments,
sub-routines and functions that are responsible to do MP and MG related tasks
such as: encryption and decryption algorithms, mechansism to insert cryptosystem
keys, mechanisms for enforcing terms and conditions, mechanisms for evaluating end
user’s environment-integrity, mechanisms for individualizing MG(s), mechanisms for


























































































































































































































Figure 32: Persistent protected & scalable delivery work ﬂow
As we assumed, there will be a contract signed by both the MR and the CP; that
contract is a consent between both parties that their works must be legal. In this
case no connction is established by the NSP and the CP or CS unless it has been
approved by the MR. That will help if any illegal content media is distributed by an
illegal CP, then it is the responsibility of the MR is to judge that bad CP which is
easy to catch by the NSP.
Now we come to the most important part: when and where should the MG be
individualised? We need to study this issue for two reasons: to trace back the source
of illegal distribution and increase the scalability of our proposal to the maximum.
To answer this question, we need to know more details about last mile delivery.
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Policy
List of subroutines and decisions


























Figure 33: Mobile security provider’s work ﬂow
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8.2 Last Mile Connection
Last mile connection, also called ﬁrst mile connection, refers to the one-to-one con-
nection between a network customer and the network service oﬃce. Whatever the
intermediate connections that builds the network, the last mile connection is the leg
that connects the end user to the public or private network, whether that connection
is used for data uploading or downloading. As has been suggested in [Hel06], the
content media distribution network is divided into three levels:
• National Hubs
The active components, such as satellite, that are used to connect territories
and countries form the national hubs. They are supposed to have a big store
for submitted content media to be distributed within the country.
• Regional Hubs
The active components that form the network backbone or core, where each
country has a network core in order to connect the whole country’s regions.
The regional hub is the intermediate connection between the national hubs and
the local hubs.
• Local Hubs
The components that connect the customer to the network core.
8.2.1 Last Mile Connection Over Copper Based Connection
Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) is a copper based connection between
the end user and a network regional oﬃce. For downstream data rate of 8 Mbps
and upstream data rate of 768 Kbps, the maximum distance of the copper based
connection beween the subscriber’s premises and the telephone branch oﬃce should
not exceed 5.5 Km [Hel06].
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Figure 34: Physical network connection [nuP].
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ADSL2+ is a twisted pair copper based wire that provides up 10 Mbps downstream
bit rate transmission, and 3 Mbps upstream over maximum distance of 2 km from the
DSLAM. Note that ADSL2+ may provide 26 Mbps over 300 meter of twisted pair
copper based wire [FB06, Hel06].
The acceptable range of the cable length used in a very-high-bitrate DSL (VDSL)
is up to 900 meters. At 300 meters the twisted pair copper based wire can carry up to
52 Mbps acceptable downstream bit rate transmission. The acceptable downstream
transmission decreases to 19.2 Mbps when the cable length approaches 900 meters
[FB06].
A connection between multiple ADSL, VDSL, or any kind of DSL signals, requires
a Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer (DSLAM) device. This device will allow
for more functionality and control over the network [wik].
8.2.2 Last Mile Connection Over Optical Connections
Nowadays, due to the increasing demand for more bandwidth, Internet speed is in-
creasing from Mbps to Gbps owing to the advances in ﬁber optic technology. Com-
pared to copper-based connections, ﬁber optic lines provide a higher data transmission
rate and a longer distance connection between the subscribers and the central oﬃce.
Fijnvandraat and Bouwman [FB06] categorize last mile optical networks into two
types depending on the active electronic devices that participate in the connection
between two terminals:
• Optical network or optical Ethernet: In this category, there are routers, gate-
ways or multiplexers between the end user’s premise and the network branch
oﬃce.
• Passive optical network: In this category, there are no routers, gateways or
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multiplexers between the end users’ premises and the network branch oﬃce;
instead, it has been replaced by a single ﬁber optical connection.
Generally, last mile connections that use optical connections are divided into the
following categories:
• The Optical Line Termination (OLT): The Optical Line Termination is a net-
work interface that combines electrical data, which comes from multiple base
1000T Ethernet routers, gateways and multiplexers residing in the network core,
to form a single optical-ﬁber. Usually, OLT exists at the companies’ central of-
ﬁces. The OLT can support up to 512 end users [Hel06, O’D08, nuP, Opt].
• Fiber-to-the-home (FTTH): It is possible these days to connect the end user
directly to the company central oﬃce via ﬁber cable called Fiber-to-the-home
(FTTH) connection. This one-to-one connection provides 400 times faster data
rate than ADSL connection. This type of network connection is useful for the
content server in order to provide the network with high quality content media
within fast speed.
• Passive Optical Network (PON): In this category, there are no routers, gateways
or multiplexers between the end users’ premises and the network branch oﬃce;
instead, it has been replaced by a single ﬁber optical connection.
The transmission medium determines the maximum transmission rate, which is
measured by bits per second (bps). Transmission media types are as follows [Hal96]:
• Twisted pair lines: it is subdivided into: unshielded twisted pair (UTP) and
shielded twisted pair (STP). This type of connection supports data rates of
1Mbps with distances shorter than or equal 100 meters. It supports lower bit
rate with longer distance than 100 meters, and support more bit rate with
distance shorter than 100 meters.
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• Coaxial cables: this type of connections can support 10 Mbps, and with dis-
tances lower than or equal to 500 meters. This type of connection suﬀers high
maintenance cost.
• Optical ﬁber: this type supports 1 G bps with distances less than or equal to
20 Km.
• Satellites: this type composes Terrestrial microwave and radio transmissions.
This kind of transmission usually does not support higher transmission rate.
From the previous list, we can notice that ﬁber optics has larger bandwidth and
longer distance for signal to reach. That gives an indication for future bandwidth
demand, it is better to install ﬁber to the home. The end user can be satisﬁed with
ADSL and ADSL+ connections, but the CS, the CP, the MR and the MSP should
use ﬁber optics connections.
8.3 The MP and MG Individualization Point
The CP is a network customer that needs to be connected to the NSP in order to
multicast the content media via the CS that works for him. For eﬃciency purposes,
it is recommended that the last mile connection to the CS be ﬁber optics. A suﬃcient
amount of time before the new epoch starts, the CP needs to receive individualized
version of MP that is responsible for ﬁngerpring the sub-content media with a unique
identiﬁer of the CP, which is a proof for the legality of the content media distribution.
This suﬃcient time needs to be short enough before the distribution starts for that
sub-media, thus the CP or CS does not have the time to attack the MP instance.
The individualization process is done by adding unique tokens that represent the CP
into speciﬁc points of the MP, these points are determined by the MSP. The MSP
informs the MR with the predetermined hash value of MP along with the protection
software that runs at CP side, which is used to deploy the protection action.
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The MP runs at the CP site and computes the integrity of the CP and then sends
the result hash value to the MR. The MR checks the validity of the received hash
value; in case of valid response, it tells the NSP to open the gate for incoming ﬂow
from the CS.
For the end user, s/he can use ﬁber or coper-based connection for the last mile
connection. Every MG instance needs to be individualized by injecting the end user’s
ticket into the MG; then, the individualized MG must be unicast to the speciﬁc end
user. In order to prevent the end user from searching for the ticket pattern within the
MG, the ticket needs to be split into multiple pieces, which are injected into multiple
places within the MG. These places are predicted by the NSP but not by the end
user. This process prevents the user from modifying the MG for a certain amount
of time, because, the MG need to be excuted on the end user’s machine and then
compute the hash value of the MG along with VS. That hash value needs to be sent
to the NSP. Then, the NSP validates the hash value, which reﬂects the end user’s
integrity as has been described in the previous chapter.
To maximize scalability of distributing the MG, the unindividualized MG needs
to be multicast until the last mile edge; at that point, the individualisation process
should begin. Then, the individualized MG is unicast to the end user. This pro-
cess assures that the scalability is not aﬀected during the transport from multicast
unindividualized MG(s) into unicast individualized MG(s).
For the individualization process we could do the following:
• Place a computer in the branch oﬃce, that computer is responsible for doing
the individualization process.
• The optical line terminals, which are used for last mile connections, are hardware
designed to do a particular job, and it may be easy to add individualization
function.
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• Redesign the curb side box and then put another hardware card in it. The card
works as distributed controller to do the individualization proccess for the NSP.
We do not need to validate the exchanged protocols between the MSP, the NSP
and the EU because it is similar to the protocol that happens between the MR, the
NSP and the EU that we proposed and validated in the previous chapter.
We can allow every end user to have a domain access for the content media, in
such a way that one ticket allows one user to watch the content media via N diﬀerent
machines or VS instances that are owned by the same user. We could allow that by
permitting the user to receive N individualized MG on his N machines or VS instances,
and then the NSP counts N hash-value that comes from the same user. Afterward,
the NSP sends the suitable media keys for each machine or VS instance. This idea
gives the end user the ability to watch N diﬀerent channels that are supported by the
NSP on N diﬀerent machines or N diﬀerent VS instance.
Within the trust interval, if the VS wants to change to diﬀerent channels that are
supported supported by the NSP and allowed to be viewed using the same ticket, then
the NSP sent the new media key encrypted with the established secret key K, that is
generated by the merchant and embedded in the ticket. Another possible scenario is
that the NSP injects an asymmetric key pair in to the MG instance before sending
it the speciﬁc VS. Then the NSP encrypts any new media key using the public key.
The MG instance’s public key is not known to anyone but the NSP. This property
increases the security relation between the NSP and the VS, and then subsequently,
the MG’s private key may used for injecting a unique ﬁnger-print into received sub-






















































Figure 36: Individualization in curb level
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8.4 Summary
In this chapter we minimized the number of MGs produced by adding a new role
called mobile security provider (MSP), which is responsible for producing one version
of MG and MP per trust interval. In this case the end user receives only one version of
MG within an individual trust interval, and if the end user wants to switch between
channels, he only needs to receive the decryption key for the new channel. Also
we provided distributed cloning and individualization processes, which makes the
resulting architecture more scalable.
To conclude, the architecture that we are proposing contains six roles, those roles
collaborate together in order to provide a scalable and persistent protection in multi-
cast content delivery (PPMCD). Those roles are: the CP, the CS, the MR, the MSP,
the NSP and the EU. In this chapter, we proposed a solution to individualize each
MG copy for each individual end user.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
Internet distribution provides a ﬂexible way to distribute intellectual property such
as software, entertainment, etc. Cryptography technologies can be used to protect
the intellectual property in transit in the network; thus it provides protection before
delivery. Cryptography technologies alone cannot protect the intellectual property
when it is hosted in the target’s environment that is outside the control of the con-
tent owner; and thus it does not provide protection after delivery. Digital Rights
Management is used to protect content media while it is in the end user’s machine
but it is subject to various attacks such as reverse engineering because it uses long-
term protection mechanisms. Thus, the persistent protection that has been promised
by DRM systems is not persistent.
In this thesis, we studied some DRM systems and learned through the study their
strengths and weaknesses, and also the means used to achieve protection after delivery,
which are divided into two directions: protection after delivery via hardware-based
protection and protection after delivery via software approach. Because we are look-
ing to a solution that can be quickly deployed into general personal computers and
laptops, we preferred to go in the second direction. DRM technologies are primarily
based on a unicast one-to-one distribution model, which is not scalable, and that
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leads to a growing need for scalable and persistent protection delivery. Secure multi-
cast can satisfy the scalability requirement, but it does not provide protection after
content media delivery. Our target in this thesis is to design a ﬂexible mechanism,
architecture and protocols, for scalable, scheduled and persistently protected content
media delivery.
In order to extend the content owner’s control and prevent the customer from
accessing the delivered content, we collected and presented eleven basic DRM re-
quirements which are necessary in ideal unicast-based DRM systems, and that was
the beginning road to push these requirements into multicast world. We realized that
most of the unicast-based DRM are the same for multicast-based DRM, however the
implementation and architecture are diﬀerent. The DRM requirements covers ﬁve
aspects: access control, security, privacy, robustness and marketing. The comparison
we made of diﬀerent DRM systems with respect to the eleven requirements, see the
table in Figure 15, gives us a clear picture that existing DRM systems do not satisfy
all these requirements.
Atwood’s multicast security architecture has some of the eleven requirements, but
it does not deal with DRM or persistent protection.
We analyzed the eleven requirements for basic DRM system, and found that the
“on demand” requirement conﬂicts with the “scalability” requirement. We suggested
a trade-oﬀ solution would be on dropping the “on demand” requirement and enhanc-
ing the “scalability” requirement.
We recognized that Grimen et al.’s model is a potential solution for the persistent
protection delivery model. Furthermore, we discovered a ﬂaw in their model, because
there is no possibility to distinguish between “mobile guard” copies. We ﬁxed the
ﬂaw by individualizing each copy of the mobile guard, and then based on Grimen et
al.’s model, we proposed an improved model. Finally, we validated both protocols.
However, the original and improved Geimen et al.’s models do not scale for a large
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number of users.
The improved Grimen et al.’s model provides persistent protection for the de-
livered content media, but it is not scalable. Multicast secure architecture model
provides a scalable delivery system but the delivered content media is not persis-
tently protected. It is clear both models have advantages and disadvantages. At this
stage it is clear that we can reach the ﬁnal goal if we marry the improved Grimen, et
al.’s model with the multicast secure architecture model.
We proposed a protocol and an architecture for the result of merging both multi-
cast secure architecture and improved Grimen et al.’s model, and then validated the
protocol. We showed that the new model achieves scalable and persistent protection
for delivered content media; and then, we proposed an architecture for a more dis-
tributed, scalable and persistent protection of the delivered content media, and there
we adapted the architecture so it provides a scalable individualization technology for
the mobile guard and mobile protection plug-in code.
In this thesis, we used software-based protection and the idea of renewability of one
component of the software-based protection, i.e., mobile guard. We used a multicast
distribution mechanism to distribute both mobile guards and media documents. Our
novelty is to show how to merge the ideas of using mobile guard, renewability and
multicast in such a way that the resulting solution does not need expensive hardware
to be deployed, and is scalable, cost eﬀective, and exhibits persistent protection for
delivered media.
In this work, we did not address the privacy requirement, so for future work, we
will concentrate on the end user privacy protection.
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Appendix A
Original Grimen et al. Protocol
Validation
In this section we will show the code we wrote to validate the Grimen proposed
protocol. The following lines are the code used to validate the key exchange protocol
proposed by Grimen et al. that takes place between the mobile guard and the security
server:








local State : nat,
Nm, Ns: text,
ChkSum : message
init State := 0
transition
0. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ Nm’ := new()/\ Tki’:= new()





2. State = 2 /\ RCV({Nm.Ns’.S}_Km) =|>
State’:= 4 /\ SND({Ns’.M}_Ks)
4. State = 4 /\ RCV({Mki’.S}_Tki) =|>









SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played_by S def=
local State : nat,
Nm, Ns: text
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV({Nm’.Tki’.M}_Ks.Hash(M.Nm’.Tki’)) =|>
State’:= 3 /\ Ns’ := new() /\ SND({Nm’.Ns’.S}_Km)
/\ witness(S,M,server_mobileGuard_ns,Ns’)
3. State = 3 /\ RCV({Ns.M}_Ks)
=|>


















const m, s : agent,
km, ks, ki : public_key,
tk, mk, tki,mki: symmetric_key,
secMK, secTK, mobileGuard_server_nm,
mobileGuard_server_tki, server_mobileGuard_ns : protocol_id,
h : hash_func
% mobileGuard_server_ns,

















Improved Version of Grimen et al.
Protocol Validation
In this section we will show the code we wrote to validate the proposed solution
for Grimen et al. protocol. The following lines are the code used to validate the
key exchange protocol proposed by us to solve the problem found at Grimen et al.
proposed key exchange protocol that takes place between the mobile guard and the
security server:













init State := 0
transition
0. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|>
State’:= 2 /\ Nm’ := new()/\ Tki’:= new()





2. State = 2 /\ RCV({Nm.Ns’.S}_Km) =|>
State’:= 4 /\ SND({Ns’.M}_Ks)
%/\ request(M,S,mobileGuard_server_ns,Ns’)
4. State = 4 /\ RCV({Mki’.S}_Tki) =|>









SND, RCV: channel (dy))
played_by S def=
local State : nat,
Nm, Ns: text,
Tki,Mki: symmetric_key
init State := 1
transition
1. State = 1 /\ RCV({{Nm’.Tki’.M.Ticket}_Ks}_K.Hash(M.Nm’.Tki’.Ticket)) =|>
State’:= 3 /\ Ns’ := new() /\ SND({Nm’.Ns’.S}_Km)
/\ secret(Tki’, secTK,{M,S})
/\ witness(S,M,mobileGuard_server_nm,Nm’)
3. State = 3 /\ RCV({Ns.M}_Ks)
=|>







role session(M, S: agent, Km, Ks: public_key, K,Tki,Mki: symmetric_key,Ticket: mes
Hash: hash_func)
def=







const m, s : agent,
km, ks, ki : public_key,
k,tk, mk, tki,mki: symmetric_key,






















Persistent Protection in Multicast
Content Delivery Protocol
Validation
In this section, we will check the validity of the proposed protocol using the AVISPA
tool. The following is the code used to validate the authentication protocol that takes
place between the MR, NSP and VS. Figure 27 illustrates the MG delivery protocol:
PROTOCOL: Mobile Guard Delivery
PURPOSE: This protocol describes the interaction among three major entities:
the merchant, the viewer software and the network service provider. The purpose
of this protocol is to securely deliver an individualized mobile guard instance to the
viewer software, which is located in end user’s machine. The individualized mobile
guard is a plug-in software that contains the media key. This protocol allows the




• VS ->MR : VS.NSP.MR,{{Nvs.VS.NSP.Minfo.Money} KMR} Kvm
• MR ->VS : VS,NSP,MR,{{VS,NSP,MR,K,Nvs,Nmr} Kvm,Ticket} Kvm
• VS ->NSP: VS,NSP,Nvs,{Ticket.{Nvs.Nmr} K} Kvn
• NSP ->MR: TicketID,{{Nvs,Nmr,NSP,MR,VS,TicketID} KMR} K
• MR ->NSP: TicketID,{{Nvs,Nmr,NSP,MR,VS,TicketID,MGi} KNSP}} K
• NSP ->VS: VS,NSP,MR,{{Nmr,Nvs,Individualized-MGi K} K} Kvn
• VS ->NSP: {HashValue} K
• NSP ->VS: VS,NSP,MR,{VS,NSP,Nvs,Nmr,MK} HashValue
PROBLEMS:
• Secrecy of session key K that is established to be shared between the NSP and
VS
• Secrecy of the MG
• Secrecy of the ticket
• Secrecy of the media key mk
• Authentication on the VS nonce
• Authentication on the MR nonce
ATTACKS: No attack has been found
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role vs (VS, MR, NSP: agent,
KNSP, KMR : public_key,
% KNSP : NSP’s public-key and KMR : MR’s public-key
Kvm,Kvn : symmetric_key,
% Kvm:Access key between VS and MR Kvn:Access key between VS and NSP
Money, Minfo : text,
% Money : Payment-token and Minfo : Media information
Hash: hash_func,
% Hash : One way hash-function
SND_MRVS, RCV_MRVS, SND_NSPVS, RCV_NSPVS: channel(dy))
% SND_MRVS, RCV_MRVS, SND_NSPVS and RCV_NSPVS are channel controlled by dy
played_by VS
def=
local State : nat,
Nvs,Nmr : text,
% Nvs: a nonce generated by the VS
% Nmr: a nonce generated by the MR
K : symmetric_key,
% K : shared-key issued by the merchant
Ticket : {symmetric_key.text.text.text.text.agent.agent.agent}_public_key,
% The Ticket issued by the MR
MK: symmetric_key, % media key
MGi: {text.symmetric_key.text}_symmetric_key,
% MGi: An instance of mobile guard for a specific trust-interval
HashValue : message
% Hash-value: used for integrity checking for the MG+VS+MK+Ticket
const vs_mr_na, vs_nsp_na, vs_nsp_nb : protocol_id
init State := 0
transition
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% generate nonce Nvs and choose the suaitable media information
% and send them with the Money token to the merchant
1. State = 0 /\ RCV_NSPVS(start)
=|>
State’:= 2 /\ Nvs’ := new()
/\ SND_MRVS(VS.NSP.MR.{{Nvs’.VS.NSP.MR.Minfo.Money}_KMR}_Kvm)










/\ HashValue’ := Hash(VS.MGi’)
/\ SND_NSPVS({HashValue’}_K)










role mr (VS, MR, NSP : agent,
KNSP, KMR : public_key,
% KNSP : NSP’s public-key and KMR : MR’s public-key
Kvm : symmetric_key,
% Kvm:Access key between VS and MR
Money, Minfo : text,
% Money : Payment-token and Minfo : Media information
SND_VSMR, RCV_VSMR,SND_NSPMR, RCV_NSPMR: channel(dy))
% SND_VSMR, RCV_VSMR,SND_NSPMR and RCV_NSPMR are channel controlled by dy
played_by MR
def=
local State : nat,
Nmr,Nvs : text,
% Nvs: a nonce generated by the VS
% Nmr: a nonce generated by the MR
K : symmetric_key,
% K : shared-key issued by the merchant
TicketID : text,
% The Ticket ID generated by the MR
PC: text, % protection code.
MK: symmetric_key % Media key
const vs_mr_na : protocol_id
init State := 1
transition










2. State = 3
/\ RCV_NSPMR(TicketID.{{Nvs.Nmr.NSP.MR.VS.TicketID}_KMR}_K)
=|>






role nsp (VS, MR, NSP: agent,
KNSP, KMR : public_key,
% KNSP : NSP’s public-key and KMR : MR’s public-key
Kvn : symmetric_key, % Kvn:shared key between VS and NSP
% Kvn:Access key between VS and NSP
Minfo : text,
% Minfo : Media information
Hash: hash_func,
SND_VSNSP, RCV_VSNSP, SND_MRNSP,RCV_MRNSP: channel(dy))




local State : nat,
Nmr, Nvs : text,
% Nvs: a nonce generated by the VS
% Nmr: a nonce generated by the MR
K : symmetric_key,
% K : shared-key issued by the merchant
TicketID : text,
% The Ticket ID generated by the MR
PC: text, % Protection Code
MK: symmetric_key, % Media key,
HashValue : message
% Hash : One way hash-function
const vs_nsp_na,vs_nsp_nb: protocol_id
init State := 5
transition








2. State = 7 /\ RCV_MRNSP(TicketID.{{Nvs.Nmr.NSP.MR.VS.TicketID.PC’.MK’}_KNSP}_K)
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=|>
State’:= 9 /\ SND_VSNSP(VS.NSP.MR.{{Nmr.Nvs.{PC’.MK’.TicketID}_K}_K}_Kvn)
/\ secret(MK’,mk,{VS,NSP})
3. State = 9 /\ RCV_MRNSP({HashValue’}_K)
=|>
State’:= 11




role session(VS, MR, NSP : agent,
KNSP, KMR : public_key,
Kvm, Kvn : symmetric_key,








SNSPMR, RNSPMR : channel (dy)
composition
vs (VS, MR, NSP, KNSP, KMR, Kvm,Kvn, Money, Minfo, Hash, SMRVS, RMRVS,
SNSPVS, RNSPVS)
/\ mr(VS, MR, NSP, KNSP, KMR, Kvm, Money, Minfo, SVSMR,
RVSMR,SNSPMR,RVSMR)






const vs1, nsp1, mr1 : agent,
knsp, kmr, ki : public_key,
kvm, kvn : symmetric_key,
money, minfo : text,
h: hash_func,
vs_mr_na, vs_nsp_na, vs_nsp_nb,k, mg, ticket,mk: protocol_id
% Nonce_VS_NSP , Ticket_Key, Mobile_Guard_Mobile_protection, Media_Key
intruder_knowledge = {vs1, nsp1, mr1, ki,inv(ki), knsp, kmr, h }
composition
session(vs1,mr1,nsp1,knsp,kmr,kvm,kvn,money, minfo,h)
/\ session(vs1,mr1,i,knsp,ki,kvm,kvn,money, minfo,h)
/\ session(i,mr1,nsp1,knsp,kmr,kvm,kvn,money, minfo,h)
/\ session(vs1,i,nsp1,knsp,ki,kvm,kvn,money, minfo,h)
end role
%%
goal
secrecy_of k
secrecy_of mg
secrecy_of ticket
secrecy_of mk
authentication_on vs_mr_na
authentication_on vs_nsp_na
authentication_on vs_nsp_nb
end goal
%%
environment()
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